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To talk of universal, natural, or human rights is to connect re-
spect for human life and integrity with the notion of auton-
omy .... With the development of the post-Romantic notion of
individual difference, this expands to the demand that we give
people the freedom to develop their personality in their own way,
however repugnant to ourselves and even to our moral sense ....
Charles Taylor'
I. INTRODUCTION
AN unforeseen Millian 2 moment recently occurred at the United States
1 upreme Court, initiated by one of the Supreme Court's conservative
members in the dramatic and singular case of Lawrence v. Texas.3 While
many commentators have looked on with puzzlement, dismay and wonder
at Justice Kennedy's cryptic opinion for the majority, 4 this article reads
Lawrence as embracing a Millian notion of personal autonomy, grounded
1. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDEN-
TITY 12 (1989).
2. "Millian" refers to the philosophical thought of the eminent nineteenth-
century utilitarian philosopher, John Stuart Mill. His moral philosophy is
grounded on the belief that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others." See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 11 (David Spitz ed.,
W.W. Norton & Co. 1975) (advocating that individual liberties may only be inter-
fered with in context of protection).
3. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
4. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1140,
1141 (2004) (questioning individual liberties actually granted in Lawrence); Kathe-
rine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REv.
1399, 1399-400 (2004) (questioning Lawrence's impact "as a matter of freedom, as
a matter of rights, as a matter of sexual politics"); Nan D. Hunter, Living with Law-
rence, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1103, 1103-04 (2004) (describing difficulties in under-
standing Lawrence opinion); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The
Fundamental Right That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1893, 1895
(2004) (questioning future impact of Lawrence); Martin A. Schwartz, Constitutional
Basis of 'Lawrence v. Texas,' N.Y. L.J., Oct. 14, 2003, at 3 (stating that Lawrence
decision is "virtually certain [to] spark numerous constitutional challenges to
other governmental policies that disadvantage homosexuals").
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in the liberty-affirming exhortation that "[ o lver himself, over his own body
and mind, the individual is sovereign."
5
Of course, it is all well and good to speak in the often ethereal lan-
guage of moral philosophy. In more practical terms, the Supreme Court
appears to have achieved this jurisprudential recalibration by countenanc-
ing an original approach to substantive due process, which has three im-
portant dimensions. 6 First, Lawrence makes a subtle, innovative move by
formally recognizing the overlapping nature of equal protection and sub-
stantive due process. 7 Second, and based on this recognition, Lawrence
imports from equal protection analysis into the substantive due process
context a more searching form of rational basis review (sometimes called
"rational review with bite") to comparatively analyze the importance of the
individual's personal and private relationships with the state's purported
5. MiuL, supra note 2, at 11 (arguing that society should not restrict individual
liberties where those liberties concern individual alone); see also William N. Es-
kridge, Jr., Lawrence'sJurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of
Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1021, 1083 & n.210 (2004) (observing that Law-
rence may be read to establish strong libertarian baseline for state regulation of
sexual activities, as "[s]ome of the language of Justice Kennedy's opinion has a
whiff of Mill"); Hunter, supra note 4, at 1105 (recognizing that Lawrence can be
read as libertarian anthem); Tribe, supra note 4, at 1938 (observing that although
Justice Holmes famously complained about Supreme Court enacting "Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics" in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905), he did not
proclaim that Constitution failed to enact John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, because
saying that would have been inconsistent with reading Constitution as charter of
pure liberal individualism); cf Julie M. Spanbauer, Kimel and Garrett: Another Ex-
ample of Court Undervaluing Individual Sovereignty and Settled Expectations, 76 TEMP. L.
REv. 787, 820 (2003) ("A very basic consideration and beginning point of constitu-
tional analysis is its recognition of individual rights, rendering the individual sover-
eign over certain spheres of life, while simultaneously granting powers to the
states."). But see Franke, supra note 4, at 1400-01 (arguing that Lawrence relies on
narrow version of liberty that is both "geographized and domesticated"); Miranda
Oshige McGowan, From Outlaws to Ingroup: Romer, Lawrence, and the Inevitable
Normativity of Group Recognition, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1312, 1315-32 (2004) (arguing
that Lawrence is not Millian in orientation); Louis Michael Seidman, Out of Bounds,
64 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
("Reading the harm principle into the Constitution elevates a particular and con-
testable moral theory over its many plausible rivals .... In effect, it establishes an
official morality in the teeth of Lawrence's Court's own claim that the government
has no business enshrining official moral principles.").
6. Other commentators have also recognized that Lawrence represents a new
approach to substantive due process. See Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court 2002
Term, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARv.
L. REv. 4, 97 (2003) ("Themes of respect and stigma are at the moral center of the
Lawrence opinion, and they are entirely new to substantive due process doctrine.");
Tribe, supra note 4, at 1899 ("Lawrence significantly altered the historical trajectory
of substantive due process and thus of liberty.").
7. For a further discussion of the redefined relationship between equal pro-
tection and substantive due process, see infra notes 38-46 and accompanying text;
see also Tribe, supra note 4, at 1945 (arguing that equal liberty recognized by Law-
rence is 'outgrowth of the combination of due process and equal protection that
drove the Court's decision").
119
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interests. 8 Under this approach, the Court is able to give substantial
weight to an individual's liberty interests in forming and maintaining pri-
vate intimate associations. 9 Third, rather than applying traditional labels
to individual rights, such as "fundamental interests" and "liberty interests,"
the Court softens the hard edges of the normal tiered approach and en-
gages in a more informal constitutional balancing of the relevant state and
individual interests to determine which interests should prevail.10
Applying this new form of substantive due process doctrine to the
facts of Lawrence, the Supreme Court determined that the majority's mere
moral disapproval of the private practice of consensual homosexual sod-
omy would no longer suffice as a valid state justification for intruding
upon an individual's rights to privacy and intimate association.' 1 In bal-
ancing the relevant state and individual interests in Lawrence, the Court
decided that the articulated state interests were not substantial enough to
outweigh the important interests of individuals in exercising their individ-
ual autonomy. 12 Because the Court found that the constitutional balance
in this context favored the individual, it upheld the legality of such individ-
8. For a further discussion of the standard of review used by the Court in
Lawrence, see infra notes 47-89 and accompanying text.
9. For a further discussion of the Court's analysis of individual autonomy, see
infra notes 47-89 and accompanying text.
10. For a further discussion of the Court's balancing of state and individual
interests in Lawrence, see infra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
11. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) ("[Tihe fact that the gov-
erning majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral
is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice .. ") (quot-
ing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting))); see also
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing Hardwick's claim as
centering on "his privacy and his right of intimate association"). Similar to Justice
Blackmun, I believe that the right to personal autonomy consists of two separate,
already recognized liberty interests, both of which are grounded in the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) the
right to privacy found in such cases as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and (2) the right to intimate association
found in the case of Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). Accord Edward
Stein, Introducing Lawrence v. Texas: Some Background and a Glimpse of the Future, 10
CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 263, 288 (2004) ("In overturning Bowers, Lawrence dis-
place[d] Bowers' narrow view of the right to privacy, arguably broadening it into a
right to intimate association .... ).
12. For a further discussion of the Lawrence Court's recognition and descrip-
tion of the right to private intimate association, see infra notes 90-100 and accom-
panying text. Professor Sunstein has talked about a balancing approach to rational
review with bite cases in the equal protection context. See Cass R. Sunstein, The
Supreme Court 1995 Term, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4, 77
(1996) (stating that "there has been at least a modest convergence away from tiers
toward general balancing of relevant interests"). This article argues that Lawrence
implicitly applies the same heightened rational basis review in the substantive due
process context. For a further discussion on the standard of review utilized by the
Court in Lawrence when examining substantive due process issues, see infra notes
47-89 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 50: p. 117
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ual practices, even though such behavior was morally repugnant to the
majority in Texas.1 3
To consider what practical impact Lawrence's Millian moment might
have on state regulation of personal relationships in other forums, this
article selects a highly controversial area of public employment law within
the higher education context. In seeking to regulate consensual relation-
ships between faculty and students, public universities 4 are increasingly
passing consensual relationship policies that prohibit some, or all, faculty-
student relationships.1 5 Such heavy-handed state regulation collides head-
13. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79 (holding that private homosexual con-
duct was not crime). The Lawrence Court's finding in this regard was consistent
with Mill's basic civil libertarian philosophy espoused in On Liberty:
[T] he principle [of human liberty] requires liberty of tastes and pursuits;
of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we
like, subject to the consequences as may follow: without impediment
from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them,
even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong.
MILL, supra note 2, at 13; see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for
Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1233, 1305 (2004)
(arguing that government should only "adopt[ ] laws and policies that can bejusti-
fied by reference to observable or otherwise demonstrable harms").
14. "Public university" and "university" are used interchangeably in this arti-
cle, as the primary focus is on the validity of university state action that interferes
with the personal autonomy of its professors. Generally, the requisite state action
for constitutional purposes is considered lacking when private university or college
conduct is in question. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841-43 (1982)
(holding that discharge of private school teachers was not state action and that
private school was not subject to constraints of federal Constitution). Of course,
Supreme Court case law in the state action area is not so clear-cut. For a more
comprehensive examination of the issues surrounding the state action doctrine,
see Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction, and the
Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 329, 329-60 (1993) (ex-
ploring issues surrounding state-action doctrine).
15. See generally Neal Hutchens, The Legal Effect of College and University Policies
Prohibiting Romantic Relationships Between Students and Professors, 32 J.L. & EDuc. 411,
411-43 (2003) (commenting on implementation and effects of consensual faculty-
student relationship policies at higher education institutions). Several public uni-
versities have such conflict of interest faculty-student consensual relationship poli-
cies. See generally MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY-NORTHERN, Administrative Policy and
Procedures Manual, § 1001.12 Consensual Relationships, available at http://
www.nmclites.edu/admin/policies/1001-12.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004) (stat-
ing that "[t]he University takes the position that amorous relationships between
faculty members and students . . . are a basic violation of professional ethics, re-
gardless of the appearance of mutual consent"); UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA AT BIR-
MINGHAM, Policy Concerning Consensual Romantic Relationships, available at http://
www.iss.uab.edu/Pol/ConsensualCtab.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2004) (stating that
no "consensual romantic or sexual relationships" may exist between parties where
one party "supervises, evaluates, or grades the other party"); UNIVERSITY OF CALI-
FORNIA OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, University of California Policy on Conflicts of Interest
Created By Consensual Relationships, available at http://www.universityofcalifor-
nia.edu/regents/regmeet/mar04/504attach.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2004) (illus-
trating conflict of interest that develops with existence of consensual faculty-
student relationships and steps required of individuals to eliminate that conflict);
UNIVERSITY OF IOWA OFFICE OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY & DwVERsrrY, Policy on Consen-
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on with individual faculty members' rights to privacy and intimate
association.
Elsewhere, and mostly from a policy point of view, I have argued for a
sliding scale approach to faculty-student consensual relationship poli-
cies. 16 Under this approach, supervisory faculty-student relationships are
presumptively prohibited, while nonsupervisory relationships are pre-
sumptively permitted; the key being that neither presumption absolutely
bans any such relationship.' 7 This approach is based on the premise that
respect for personal autonomy should not mean that society reflexively
kow-tows to every quirky predilection a professor has in becoming roman-
tically involved with his or her students; nevertheless, it should mean that
an individual's rights to privacy and intimate association are taken seri-
ously and weighed in a balance of relevant interests before the professor's
rights are infringed upon by the state. I believe the legal orientation of
the sliding scale approach is consistent with the Millian approach taken by
the Lawrence Court's newfound respect for individual autonomy.
Although at least one commentator has argued that specific language
in the Lawrence decision makes its applicability to faculty-student consen-
sual relationship policies dubious,18 closer scrutiny of the Court's lan-
guage establishes that Lawrence, far from exempting student-faculty
consensual relationships, should reinvigorate faculty members' rights to
sual Relationships Involving Students, available at http://www.uiowa.edu/-eod/poli-
cies/pol-on-consensual/pol-consensual-full.html#52 (last visited Oct. 25, 2004)
(listing policies for consensual relationships involving faculty and students); UNI-
VERSITY OF NEVADA AT RENO, University Policy on Consensual Sexual Relationships,
available at http://www.unr.edu/sapd/documents/UNVERSITYPOLICYONCON-
SENSUALSEXUALRELATIONSHIPS_000.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2004) (barring
"romantic or sexual relationships only in circumstances in which one of the indi-
viduals is in a position of direct professional power over the other"); UNIVERSITY OF
TEXAS AT ARLINGTON, Fiscal Regulations and Procedures: Equal Opportunity and Affirma-
tive Action: Sexual Harassment, Sexual Misconduct and Consensual Relationships, availa-
ble at http://www3.uta.edu/policy/fisregs/eoaa/3A-l .htm (last visitedJuly 8, 2004)
(prohibiting consensual relationships between faculty and students "they currently
teach, supervise or advise"); WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY, Sexual Harassment Policy:
Policy and Procedure Regarding Sexual Harassment, available at http://www.wvu.edu/
-socjust/sexual.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004) ("It is a University policy violation
for a faculty member to engage in an amorous, dating, or sexual relationship with
a student whom the faculty member instructs, evaluates, supervises, or advises.").
16. See Paul M. Secunda, Getting to the Nexus of the Matter: A Sliding Scale Ap-
proach to Faculty-Student Consensual Relationship Policies in Higher Education, 55 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 55, 80-84 (2004) (discussing deficiencies of other approaches to
faculty-student consensual relationships).
17. See id. at 81 (explaining that, under sliding scale faculty-student consen-
sual relationship policy, consensual relationship's permissibility is based "on the
discernible impact or effect... [it will have on:] the college's or university's repu-
tation in the community.... the ability of the professor to effectively perform his
or her job, . . . [or] the desire of other third-party students or faculty members to
interact with the professor in question").
18. See Hutchens, supra note 15, at 426 ("In sum, the extent to which Lawrence
limits consensual relationship policies at public universities and colleges remains
somewhat doubtful.").
[Vol. 50: p. 117
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privacy and intimate association in the public university context. 19 Moreo-
ver, a thorough consideration of the Court's unconstitutional conditions
doctrine leads to the conclusion that a balancing of state and individual
interests is the proper way to proceed when the state acts as an employer
in the public employment context.20 And under the constitutional bal-
ancing approach embraced by the Court in Lawrence, faculty-student con-
sensual relationship policies that ban some or all supervisory relationships
in the public university context should be considered unconstitutionally
overbroad;21 the policies create an undue burden on the exercise of a
faculty member's rights to privacy and intimate association.
2 2
Nevertheless, some, including Justice Scalia, have argued that such a
broad notion of individual autonomy will inevitably cause us all to fall
down a slippery slope that will lead to a necessary acceptance of incest,
prostitution and adultery. 23 But far from signaling the end to all morals
legislation, as Justice Scalia prophesized in his Lawrence dissent,24 the
Court appears to have merely embraced a robust notion of personal au-
tonomy while still permitting a distinction to be drawn between consen-
sual, private, non-harmful conduct on the one hand, and nonconsensual,
19. For a further discussion on why the Lawrence decision does not exempt
university regulation of student-faculty consensual relationships, see infra notes
136-69 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of how the holding in Lawrence applies to the
faculty-student consensual relationship context, see infra notes 170-89 and accom-
panying text.
21. The Supreme Court has stated in the criminal context that the over-
breadth doctrine has no vitality outside of the First Amendment. See Schall v. Mar-
tin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 n.18 (1984) ("[O]utside the limited First Amendment
context, a criminal statute may not be attacked as overbroad."). However, Profes-
sors Decker and Dorf have separately and persuasively argued that the overbreadth
doctrine should not be so constrained. SeeJohn F. Decker, Overbreadth Outside the
First Amendment, 34 N.M. L. REv. 53, 55 & n.11 (2004) (stating that "there is no
legitimate reason to limit the use of overbreadth to the First Amendment and...
courts should rely on the overbreadth doctrine to protect other fundamental
rights"); Michael C. Doff, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 235, 264-65, 269 (1994) ("[S]trong theoretical and practical reasons ... jus-
tify extending the overbreadth doctrine beyond the First Amendment.").
22. For a further discussion on the unconstitutionality of overbroad public
university policies that seek to ban some or all faculty-student consensual relation-
ships, see infra notes 190-202 and accompanying text.
23. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that no rational basis exists to broaden personal autonomy protections to
.matters pertaining to sex"); see also Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d
1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004) (using slippery slope logic to uphold Alabama statute
forbidding commercial distribution of sexual devices), reh 'g and reh 'g en banc denied,
No. 02-16135DD (11th Cir. Sept. 24, 2004), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec. 17,
2004) (No. 04-849). For an excellent and comprehensive discussion of these con-
stitutional boundary issues, see Seidman, supra note 5.
24. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("State laws against
bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, for-
nication, bestiality, and obscenity are ... sustainable only in light of Bowers' valida-
tion of laws based on moral choices .... Every single one of these laws is called
into question by today's decision . . ").
HeinOnline  -- 50 Vill. L. Rev. 123 2005
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50: p. 117
public, harmful conduct on the other.25 Lawrence, and its Millian concep-
tion of liberty, teaches that individuals should be free from government
sanction so long as the conduct does not cause harm to the interests of
relevant third-parties, 2 6 certainly not a radical notion, which should keep
the Rick Santorums of the world from predicting a moral apocalypse. 2 7 At
the end of the day, we are all enriched by a judicial orientation that pro-
motes rather than destroys individual liberty.
This article describes the characteristics and ramifications of this Mil-
lian moment in six parts. Part II discusses the Lawrence decision in detail,
highlighting its treatment of the relationship between equal protection
and substantive due process, its implicit adoption of heightened rational
basis review and its use of a constitutional balancing approach to give
weight to the substantial individual liberty interests of privacy and intimate
association at stake in these types of cases. Turning to the impact of Law-
25. See Marybeth Herald, A Bedroom of One's Own: Morality and Sexual Privacy
After Lawrence v. Texas, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 38 (2004) ("The decision in
Lawrence reached the correct conclusion in granting constitutional protection to
adult sexual privacy where consensual, non-public, and no harm to third parties is
involved."); see also Carpenter, supra note 4, at 1153 (advancing argument that
right recognized in Lawrence is "of adults to engage in a noncommercial, consen-
sual, sexual relationship in private, where their activity involves no injury to a per-
son or harm to an institution (like marriage) the law protects").
26. This is the so-called "harm principle." See Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1083
(describing basics of Mill's harm principle). Many of Justice Scalia's parade of
horribles would continue to be criminally proscribed under this principle because
such conduct causes demonstrable harm to third parties or to the larger commu-
nity. See id. at 1089 (explaining that majority of conduct on Justice Scalia's list falls
within boundaries of permissible state regulation); Hunter, supra note 4, at 1112
(explaining that conduct like that found in Scalia's parade of horribles may still be
regulated if states demonstrate conduct's objectively harmful effects). For in-
stance, adultery "violates a promise of fidelity and often imposes reliance and
other costs on the innocent spouse," and public prostitution "remains universally
regulated and is associated with nuisances of various sorts." Eskridge, supra note 5,
at 1089 (listing several of Scalia's listed acts and explaining their harmful societal
effects); see also Carpenter, supra note 4, at 1154 (observing that Lawrence does not
affect laws against prostitution because it involves personal, non-commercial rela-
tionships); Stein, supra note 11, at 281 (suggesting that incest leads to harm of
younger family members within family dynamic, forcing continued state regula-
tion). On the other hand, intimate relationships between homosexuals or be-
tween faculty and students may only cause indirect harms in some circumstances,
and as argued in detail below, should only be regulated if substantial direct harms
are likely to occur to others. See C. L. Ten, Mill on Self-Regarded Actions (1969) in
MILL, supra note 2, at 11 (examining distinction between direct and indirect harms
in Millian sense). "Self-regarding actions are those actions which, if they affect
others, do so only indirectly. This means that they affect others only because they
are disliked or found to be immoral or repugnant." Id.
27. Republican United States Senator Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania stated
in an Associated Press interview that "[i]f the Supreme Court says that you have the
right to consensual (gay) sex within your home, then you have the right to bigamy,
you have the right to polygamy, you have the right to incest, you have the right to
adultery. You have the right to anything." See Sean Loughlin, Santorum Defends
Comments On Homosexuality, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/04/23/
santorum.gays/index.html (Apr. 23, 2003).
124
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rence on future state regulation of personal relationships outside of the
criminal context, Part III catalogs the various types of faculty-student con-
sensual relationship policies that public universities have enacted in recent
years. Part IV contends that the language in Lawrence does not exempt
these faculty-student consensual relationship policies in the public univer-
sity context, that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in the public
employment context makes the balancing of state and individual interests
the only proper approach and that the requirement of this balancing ap-
proach in these types of cases makes public university policies that ban
some or all consensual relationships between faculty and students uncon-
stitutionally overbroad. Part V concludes the analysis by reexamining the
sliding scale approach to faculty-student consensual relationships ad-
vanced elsewhere and by contending that such an approach is the only
appropriate one from both a policy and a constitutional perspective.
II. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS: REINVIGORATING SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The facts of Lawrence are straightforward, but, as will be illustrated
shortly, that is all that is clear-cut about this enigmatic opinion.28 In Law-
rence, two men engaging in consensual anal sex in a private residence were
arrested under the Texas sodomy statute 29 when police entered their
apartment based on a report of a weapons disturbance. 30 After being held
in jail overnight, the men were charged and convicted of violating the
statute and forced to pay a fine.3 l Thereafter, they challenged the validity
of the sodomy statute on equal protection and due process grounds under
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 32 in Texas
state court and eventually in the United States Supreme Court.33
In invalidating the sodomy statute, the Supreme Court took a signifi-
cant step in reaffirming the centrality of civil liberties in American juris-
prudence by recognizing the right of consenting adults to engage in
private intimate conduct under the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.34 Although Lawrence con-
28. See Hunter, supra note 4, at 1103 (noting that Lawrence is easy to read, but
hard to pin down).
29. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003) ("A person commits
an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of
the same sex.").
30. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (discussing facts of case).
31. See id. at 563 (same). For their crimes, the men were each fined $200 and
assessed court costs of $141.25. See id. (same).
32. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
33. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563 (listing procedural history of case).
34. See id. at 560 (stating that this case "involve[d] two adults who, with full
and mutual consent, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifes-
tyle . . . [and that their] right to liberty under the Due Process Clause g[a]ve[ ]
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cerned a criminal sodomy statute, most commentators have rightly under-
stood the breadth of the Court's holding to extend beyond the facts of the
case.3 5 Indeed, Lawrence announces a broad new principle, establishing a
greater respect than previously existed for the rights of privacy3 6 and inti-
mate association. 3 7 The Court accomplishes this doctrinal feat by intro-
ducing a new, innovative form of substantive due process, having three
distinct dimensions. It is to these three dimensions that this article now
turns.
A. Redefining the Relationship Between Substantive Due Process and
Equal Protection
The first dimension of Lawrence's new substantive due process ap-
proach concerns a subtle, innovative realignment of the relationship be-
tween substantive due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment.38 Although Lawrence by no means represents the first time
the Supreme Court or legal scholars have recognized the close relation-
them the full right to engage in [that] private conduct without government
intervention").
35. See Schwartz, supra note 4 (arguing that it is "virtually certain that Lawrence
will spark numerous constitutional challenges to other government policies" in
areas as diverse as same-sex marriage, public employment and military's "don't ask,
don't tell" policy); Tribe, supra note 4, at 1899-1900 ("The central contribution of
Lawrence... does not arise from the questions the Supreme Court answered ....
Rather, the core contribution . . . comes from the manner in which the Court
framed the question of how best to provide content to substantive due process
rights.").
36. Although there is no express mention of privacy in the United States Con-
stitution, there is a long-recognized tradition for the state to leave its citizens alone
in the context of personal relationships and in the privacy of their own bedrooms.
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness .... They conferred, as against the government, the right to
be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi-
lized men."), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). More recently,
the Supreme Court has begun to recognize specific privacy rights granted to indi-
viduals through the text of the Constitution itself. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (explaining that within penumbras and emanations of Bill of
Rights, certain levels of privacy are guaranteed); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
153 (1973) (noting that right to privacy exists in substantive aspects of liberty inter-
est described in Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Griswold, 381
U.S. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (stating that fight of marital privacy is
supported by "the language and history of the Ninth Amendment" and its reserva-
tion of certain fundamental rights to people). See generally Stein, supra note 11, at
263-66 (surveying development of right to privacy under United States Constitu-
tion). But see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605-06 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
there is no general right to privacy in United States Constitution).
37. The right to intimate association was expressly recognized in 1984. See
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (recognizing that "certain kinds
of highly personal relationships" should be afforded "a substantial measure of
sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State").
38. See Hunter, supra note 4, at 1134 (observing developing understanding of
interdependence of liberty and equality, which can be traced back to Court's abor-
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ship between these two provisions,3 9 it is the first time that the Supreme
Court has formally described in detail how the two clauses interact in cases
concerning state interference with a personal and private relationship.4 0
In this vein, the Lawrence Court explained that "[eiquality of treatment
and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the
substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a
decision on the latter point advances both interests."
4 1
In other words, the Court maintains that a decision on substantive
due process grounds will necessarily have beneficial equality conse-
quences, at least when personal relationships are involved. 42 Although
the converse is not always true, an equality-affirming decision may also
have some beneficial consequences for an individual's liberty interests. 43
Thus, the Court appears to recognize that both the complementary con-
tion cases); Tribe, supra note 4, at 1934 (arguing that link between substantive due
process and equal protection in Lawrence is important doctrinal innovation).
39. Compare M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996) (observing that "[d]ue
process and equal protection principles converge" in cases concerning parent-
child relationships) (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983))), with
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (stating that "the concepts of equal
protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness,
are not mutually exclusive"). These holdings are consistent with the views of a
number of legal scholars, which find the two clauses complementary, not inter-
changeable. See, e.g., Ira Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77
MICH. L. REv. 981, 982-85 (1979) (depicting inaccurate blending of equal protec-
tion and due process doctrines).
40. Other courts have recently described this same interconnectedness of sub-
stantive due process and equal protection. In a landmark decision, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that "[i]n matters implicating marriage,
family life, and the upbringing of children, the two constitutional concepts fre-
quently overlap, as they do here." See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.
2d. 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (finding right to same-sex marriage under Massachusetts
state constitution); see also Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 18-19 (Cal. 1948) (analyz-
ing statutory ban on interracial marriage as equal protection violation concerning
regulation of fundamental right).
41. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (detailing ways that equal protection and due
process commingle in context of homosexual discrimination). Additionally, the
confluence of equal protection and substantive due process analysis in the per-
sonal relationship context makes sense given that rights considered fundamental
in the equal protection context are similar to those considered fundamental in the
substantive due process context. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390-91
(1978) (right to marry); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-67 (1973) (right to have
abortion); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 543 (1942) (right to procreate); see
also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(preventing city of Cleveland from standardizing definition of "family" under sub-
stantive Due Process Clause).
42. See Tribe, supra note 4, at 1898 (arguing that, far from having separate
missions and entailing different inquiries, equal protection and substantive due
process "are profoundly interlocked in a legal double helix").
43. For example, when African-American citizens' equal right to vote in
American elections was diluted by certain state actions and such actions were
found to be unconstitutional, the consequence of this equality-affirming decision
of the Supreme Court was also an increased respect for African-American dignity
and autonomy. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 348 (1960) (analyzing
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cepts of equality and liberty embrace a robust notion of individual auton-
omy and human dignity. 4 4  And because of the nature of this
"interlock[ing] . . . legal double helix,"4 5 this article contends that much
of the analysis undertaken in the equal protection context has been im-
plicitly adopted by the Supreme Court in the substantive due process
context.
46
B. Reading Lawrence's Tea Leaves for a Standard of Review
Having established the interconnected dynamic between equal pro-
tection and substantive due process, the second dimension of the Lawrence
Court's substantive due process analysis involves how these two strands of
the Fourteenth Amendment act in tandem to protect individual autonomy
from unwarranted state interference. This exercise in divining the proper
judicial standard of review from the Lawrence majority is rendered difficult
by the exceedingly enigmatic nature of the opinion.
4 7
Although Justice Kennedy's majority opinion finds the Texas sodomy
statute unconstitutional, the manner in which Justice Kennedy arrives at
this conclusion is both cryptic and labyrinthine. With regard to the cryptic
nature of the opinion, it can be argued that the Court, consistent with
prior substantive due process jurisprudence and principles of stare decisis,
should have decisively, in accordance with Washington v. Glucksberg,48 de-
termined whether a fundamental liberty interest existed in Lawrence.
49
state attempt at gerrymandering used to deprive African-Americans of right to
vote).
44. Accord Hunter, supra note 4, at 1103 (commenting on Lawrence's great im-
pact on both human equality and dignity); see also Tribe, supra note 4, at 1898
("The 'liberty' of which the [Lawrence] Court spoke was as much about equal dig-
nity and respect as it was about freedom of action ....").
45. Tribe, supra note 4, at 1898 (describing relationship between substantive
due process and equal protection within Lawrence).
46. See id. ("[The narrative of substantive due process] is a single, unfolding
tale of equal liberty and increasingly universal dignity."); see also id. ("Lawrence...
both presupposed and advanced an explicitly equality-based and relationally situ-
ated theory of substantive liberty. The 'liberty' of which the Court spoke was as
much about equal dignity and respect as it was about freedom of action-more so,
in fact.").
47. This author is certainly not alone in having trouble divining Lawrence's
meaning. See Hunter, supra note 4, at 1139 (observing that Lawrence leaves "enor-
mous flexibility as to how broadly or narrowly future courts will interpret it," and
that, "the most significant point to bear in mind is that the function of lower fed-
eral courts, scholars, and practitioners now will be not so much to find the mean-
ing of Lawrence as to create it."); see also Carpenter, supra note 4, at 1149 (observing
that Lawrence opinion is so opaque that it bears great many interpretations).
48. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
49. See Carpenter, supra note 4, at 1140 (describing pre-Lawrence world as bi-
furcated into large domain of unprotected "liberty interests" and very small do-
main of strongly protected "fundamental rights"). But see Tribe, supra note 4, at
1898 (maintaining that "[Lawrence] Court gave short shrift to the notion that it was
under some obligation to confine its implementation of substantive due process to
the largely mechanical exercise of isolating 'fundamental rights' as though they
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Such a determination was crucial because this initial characterization was
tantamount to how the case would be decided 5 0 -rational basis review was
equivalent to substantial deference to the state's judgment, while strict
scrutiny review usually led to a finding of unconstitutionality. 5 1 Conse-
quently, if the Court had decided that a fundamental liberty interest was at
stake in Lawrence, the Texas sodomy law would have been subject to strict
scrutiny, and, under such a test, likely struck down as not narrowly tailored
to further a compelling government interest.5 2 On the other hand, if no
were a historically given set of data points on a two dimensional grid .... "). Un-
like Professor Tribe, I do not believe thatJustice Kennedy intentionally gave "short
shrift" to traditional notions of substantive due process, but rather that he agreed
to join the majority only because he was not required to recognize the rights iden-
tified in Lawrence as traditional "fundamental rights." This understanding of Jus-
tice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence, although speculative, makes the most sense if
one considers the lengths to which he went to exclude homosexual marriage from
the Court's holding. But see Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,
953 (Mass. 2003) (citing Lawrence for support in finding right to same-sex marriage
under Massachusetts Constitution).
50. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 6 (citing comments by Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky of Duke University that standard ofjudicial review is critical and very
frequently determinative when challenging governmental policy under substantive
due process).
51. See id. ("When the Court employs low-level review it affords substantial
deference to the legislative judgment," while conversely, "high-level review typically
entails a virtual presumption of unconstitutionality."); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
at 720-21 (noting important distinction between substantive due process analysis
based on fundamental right versus non-fundamental right).
52. Under Glucksberg, there is a two-step analytical framework that the Court
applies when evaluating a claim of new fundamental rights. See Williams v. Attor-
ney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004) (providing brief discussion
of Glucksberg "fundamental right" test), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, No. 02-
16135DD (11th Cir. Sept. 24, 2004), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec. 17, 2004) (No.
04-849). First, there must be a careful description of the asserted right. See id.
Second, a court must determine whether this asserted right "is one of 'those funda-
mental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in the Nation's
history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that
neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."' See id. (quoting
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21); see also Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dept. of Children and
Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815 (11th Cir. 2004), reh'gen banc denied, 377 F.3d 1275
(11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2005) (No. 04-478)
(concluding that, through Glucksberg test, same-sex foster parents do not have con-
stitutional protections given to natural adoptive parents). This analysis has been
correctly criticized as crushing the substantive due process privacy doctrine by "re-
quiring a historical pedigree so pure as to guarantee that majoritarian rule had to
have generally protected the right in all but a few outlier states." See Herald, supra
note 25, at 8 (listing strategies employed by Justices in crushing substantive due
process doctrine); see also Tribe, supra note 4, at 1934 (noting "foolishness of at-
tempting to define the dimensions of human liberty that give rise to elevated scru-
tiny by enumerating a catalog of private actions that might (or might not) fall on
the protected side of the constitutional line").
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fundamental interest was found, the Texas sodomy law would have likely
been upheld as rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
53
To say that Lawrence is less than clear on which standard of judicial
review it applied is the height of understatement.5 4 From the first days of
its issuance, commentators have disagreed over whether Lawrence recog-
nized a sacrosanct fundamental right to private sexual intimacy or merely
identified a liberty interest that could normally, but not in this case, be
burdened by some legitimate state interest.55 This controversy derives
from the labyrinthine nature of the opinion itself.
On the one hand, from the first lines of the opinion to almost its end,
Justice Kennedy employs expressive and sweeping language to declare that
"the State is not omnipresent in the home," and that "[fWreedom extends
beyond spatial bounds," and finally "It]he instant case involves liberty of
the person both in its spatial and transcendent dimensions."5 6 Such gran-
diloquent language5 7 would seem to suggest that the liberty interest in-
volved is indeed a fundamental one. 58 On this theory, because the Texas
53. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722 (requiring identification of fundamental
right concurrent with traditional notions of liberty before allowing petitioner con-
stitutional standing for "liberty interest" claim).
54. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority decision in Lawrence for lack of clarity with regard to applied
standard of review).
55. Compare Herald, supra note 25, at 29-32 (arguing that Lawrence "is an ele-
gant discourse on individual autonomy and liberty," and that some form of height-
ened review is involved), and Hunter, supra note 4, at 1104 (reading Lawrence to
extend meaningful constitutional protection to liberty interests without denomi-
nating them fundamental rights), and Schwartz, supra note 4, at 6 (concluding that
Lawrence Court relied on "important low-level scrutiny"), and id. (describing Profes-
sor Dorf's argument that Justice Kennedy's reliance on decisions like Griswold and
Roe may imply that Court intended some form of heightened scrutiny), and Tribe,
supra note 4, at 1899 (arguing that Court in Lawrence "implicitly reject[ed] the
notion that its task was simply to name the specific activities textually or historically
treated as protected," and treats doctrine of substantive due process as reflecting
"deeper pattern involving the allocation of decision-making roles"), with Williams,
378 F.3d at 1250 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (arguing that Lawrence denominated fun-
damental right to sexual privacy), and Carpenter, supra note 4, at 1155 (interpret-
ing Lawrence to hold that right to private, intimate association is fundamental
right).
56. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (describing broadly liberty interest Court is pro-
tecting). But see State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 239 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (narrowly
construing liberty interests recognized in Lawrence), ), review granted, (May 25,
2004); Franke, supra note 4, at 1409 (arguing that "spatial" means private and
.transcendent" means relationship-based intimacy).
57. See Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1024 (observing that Lawrence's soaring rhet-
oric is found only in handful of Supreme Court decisions); Stein, supra note 11, at
273 (noting Justice Kennedy's sweeping and lyrical language in Lawrence).
58. See Carpenter, supra note 4, at 1155 (concluding that right to sexual rela-
tions between same-sex partners is fundamental in context of Lawrence Court's sur-
vey of historical privacy rights in American jurisprudence). Finding that the right
to intimate association is a fundamental right would be consistent with the classic
exposition of the contours of this right found in Professor Kenneth Karst's The
Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 625 (1980).
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anti-sodomy law burdens the exercise of a fundamental right, strict scru-
tiny mandates that the law be sustained only if it is narrowly tailored to
further a compelling government interest.
59
On the other hand, the latter portion of the opinion concludes with a
statement that the Texas sodomy statute "furthers no legitimate state inter-
est which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual."60 This language, though recognizing a liberty interest in
one's personal and private life, reflects the use of rational basis review.
6 1
Under such review, state statutes are presumptively held to be valid if ra-
tionally related to a "legitimate" state interest. 62 Regrettably, even as the
Lawrence Court tells us what is not a legitimate state interest by adopting
Justice Stevens' Bowers dissent,63 the Court fails to explain why a state does
not have a legitimate governmental interest in promoting a certain view of
morality.
6 4
Although the meaning of this schizophrenic decision is far from clear,
in this author's view, the best reading of Lawrence is that although the lib-
erty interest concerning personal autonomy is a "substantial" or "impor-
tant" one, it is not a fundamental one. 65 This reading of Lawrence is
59. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (outlining
method by which state actors may proceed to abrogate fundamental rights through
constitutionally acceptable means).
60. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
61. See id. (recognizing liberty interest, but still utilizing language normally
retained for rational basis review).
62. In this regard, I agree with Justice Scalia that the majority in Lawrence is
applying a form of rational basis review. See id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criti-
cizing majority's overly broad rational basis test as having "far-reaching implica-
tions" to other holdings). Nonetheless, I do not agree with Justice Scalia's
characterization that this form of rational basis review is an "unheard-of" form of
legal analysis. For further critical discussion of the Lawrence court's analysis of the
rational-basis standard of review, see infra notes 65-83 and accompanying text.
63. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (adopting Justice Steven's statement in
Bowers that "the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed
a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting
miscegenation from constitutional attack").
64. See id. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (drawing attention to failure ofJustice
O'Connor's reasoning to adequately describe how state interests become compro-
mised by morality concerns).
65. See Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004)
(holding that, in context of use of sexual aids, Lawrence did not recognize funda-
mental right to sexual privacy requiring strict scrutiny analysis), reh'g and reh'g en
banc denied, No. 02-16135DD (1Ith Cir. Sept. 24, 2004), petition for cert. filed, (U.S.
Dec. 17, 2004) (No. 04-849); see also Schwartz, supra note 4, at 6 (concluding that
Lawrence court did not find fundamental constitutional right to engage in consen-
sual homosexual sodomy in privacy of one's home). Although I agree with the
Williams court that Lawrence does not recognize a fundamental right to sexual pri-
vacy, in coming to its conclusion that an Alabama statute that prohibits the com-
mercial sale of sexual devices is constitutional, the Court failed to give the
necessary, heightened review to a state's infringement of an individual's rights to
privacy and intimate association required after Lawrence. See Williams, 378 F.3d at
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supported by at least two strong undercurrents in the opinion. First, in
discussing the privacy right involved in Lawrence, the Court states that "[re-
cent precedent] show[s] an emerging awareness that liberty gives substan-
tial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private
lives in matters pertaining to sex."6 6 Moreover, in discussing the liberty
interest recognized in Roe v. Wade6 7 and comparing it to the liberty inter-
est at stake in Lawrence, the Lawrence Court observes that "[a] Ithough the
Court held the woman's rights were not absolute, her right to elect an
abortion did have real and substantial protection as an exercise of her lib-
erty under the Due Process Clause."68 This repeated use of "substantial"
in Lawrence supports the conclusion that the Court is applying a standard
of judicial review, that, although not involving strict scrutiny, is neverthe-
less a form of heightened scrutiny, perhaps similar to intermediate scru-
tiny utilized with state gender classifications.
69
This view of Lawrence is also in accord with Supreme Court precedent
in the area of the right to intimate association, in which the Court has
recognized that "[a] s a general matter, only [familial] relationships.., are
likely to reflect the considerations that have led to an understanding of
freedom of association as an intrinsic element of personal liberty."70 Al-
though the intimate associations at play in Lawrence are not familial inter-
ests in the traditional sense, they are akin to "certain kinds of highly
personal relationships" that "afford ... a substantial measure of sanctuary
from unjustified interference by the State."71 Again, the use of the word
substantial in these cases is telling.
1250 (Barkett, J., dissenting) ("The majority's decision rests on the erroneous
foundation that there is no substantive due process right to adult consensual inti-
macy in the home and erroneously assumes that the promotion of public morality
provides a rational basis to criminally burden such intimate activity."). For these
reasons, I think Williams is wrongly decided and should be overtumed on Supreme
Court review.
66. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (emphasis added); see also Karst, supra note 58, at
625 (detailing emergence of Supreme Court jurisprudence based upon right to
intimate association between individuals).
67. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
68. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added).
69. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (establishing intermediate
scrutiny test under which law containing gender classification is scrutinized to de-
termine whether it substantially furthers any important government interest); see
also Hunter, supra note 4, at 1114 (maintaining that holding in Lawrence primarily
relies on protection established by previous choice cases, control of one's destiny
cases and principle of autonomy cases, such as Roe and Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992)); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 6 ("Assuming that the Court in
Lawrence employed low-level scrutiny, it was important low-level scrutiny.").
70. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984) (stressing higher than
ordinary degree of "attachments and commitments" that may warrant constitu-
tional limitations on state action).
71. See id. at 618-19 (emphasis added) (collecting constitutional cases that
"reflect[ ] the realization that individuals draw much of their emotional enrich-
ment from close ties with others").
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Second, and perhaps more important for establishing a heightened
form ofjudicial review, "rational basis review with bite"72 in the substantive
due process context is similar to that described injustice O'Connor's Law-
rence concurrence about equal protection. 73 This recognition is crucial
when one considers the interconnectedness of equal protection and sub-
stantive due process discussed above.74 In short, this implicit adoption of
the equal protection analysis in the substantive due process context is con-
sistent with the Lawrence Court's statements concerning the important
linkages between substantive due process and equal protection analysis. 7 5
Under this heightened analysis, Justice O'Connor's concurrence ac-
knowledged that the Supreme Court has "been most likely to apply ra-
tional basis review to hold a law unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause where . . . the challenged legislation inhibits personal
relationships." 76 Although the majority decision in Lawrence is far from
clear on whether Justice O'Connor's equal protection analysis properly
72. See Stein, supra note 11, at 269 (citing Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis
with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 802-03 (1987))
(discussing standard of review that lies "in between mere rational review and inter-
mediate scrutiny," known as "rational review with bite"). This heightened review
has been utilized in recent Supreme Court cases. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
632 (1996) (invalidating Colorado constitutional amendment denying homosexu-
als ability to be protected by any type of civil rights law); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1985) (invalidating state law re-
quiring home for mentally disabled to obtain special use permit while other simi-
larly situated groups, like residents of fraternity houses and apartment buildings,
were not so required); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (invalidating state
law denying undocumented school-age children of alien parents free public school
education); Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (invalidating fed-
eral law preventing households containing individuals unrelated to any other
member of household from receiving food stamps). All four of these cases, how-
ever, were decided under the equal protection clause, and not the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579-80
(O'Connor, J, concurring) (referring to judicial standard of review in these equal
protection cases as "more searching form" of rational basis review).
73. The majority in Lawrence was unwilling to rest its invalidation of the Texas
sodomy statute on equal protection, as that would permit Bowers to continue to
"demean[ ] the lives of homosexual persons." See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 3, 6
(discussing Court's use of substantive due process in Lawrence to find right to inti-
mate privacy, which mandated the overruling of Bowers (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S.
at 575)).
74. For a further discussion of the nexus between equal protection and due
process under the United States Constitution, see supra notes 38-46 and accompa-
nying text.
75. See Carpenter, supra note 4, at 1151 n.55 (noting that, although Romer is
equal protection case, there is no reason to believe that holding would not also
apply to animus-based denials of liberty under Due Process Clause). But see Su-
zanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 481, 511 n.117 (2004)
(arguing that "as no other justice joined Uustice O'Connor's] opinion, it is not
clear whether a majority of the Court shares her perspective" about heightened
rational basis review).
76. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Wilson
Huhn, The Jurisprudential Revolution: Unlocking Human Potential in Grutter and Law-
rence, 12 WM. & MARY BiLL RTS.J. 65, 97 (2003) (arguing thatJustice O'Connor's
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applies to the majority's substantive due process analysis, 77 it appears the
Court implicitly adopted a similar heightened or searching standard of
review in the substantive due process context to account for the substantial
interest that inheres in the rights to privacy and intimate association.
78
This view of the Court's decision finds doctrinal resonance in the fact that
rational basis review and the traditional conception of "legitimate state
interests" almost always lead to a state statute being found constitutionally
valid. But Lawrence, in the tradition of such equal protection cases as
Romer v. Evans,79 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Centei80 and even Craig v. Bo-
ren,
81 applied a rational basis standard of review with "a sharper focus,"
8 2
and found the Texas sodomy statute invalid. The Lawrence Court utilized
something more than deferential rational basis review. Their analysis
seemingly adopted a form of rational basis review with bite; readily recog-
nizable based on its use in previous Supreme Court equal protection
cases.
83
Thus, a closer reading of Justice Kennedy's majority opinion estab-
lishes that the Lawrence Court embraced a Millian legal orientation, sup-
concurrence signals acceptance of "sliding scale" equal protection standard advo-
cated by Justice Stevens in Cleburne).
77. Justice O'Connor avoided this issue by declaring, "[w]hether a sodomy
law that is neutral both in effect and application... would violate the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause is an issue that need not be decided today."
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 584 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy, for his
part, did not explain why the promotion of morality is not a legitimate state inter-
est under a substantive due process analysis, much to the dismay of the dissenting
Justice Scalia. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This proposition [that there is no
rational basis for the law under attack] is so out of accord with our jurispru-
dence-indeed, with the jurisprudence of any society we know-that it requires
little discussion."). Be that as it may, Justice Scalia cites only Bowers to support his
version of what constitutes the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area. One
would expect at least a substantial string cite of precedent if Justice Scalia's views
were so self-evident.
78. See id. at 578 (" [I] ndividual decisions by married persons, concerning the
intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce off-
spring, are a form of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.").
79. 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
80. 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1985).
81. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
82. See id. at 210 n.* (Powell, J., concurring) (expressing need for more
clearly defined approach to equal protection analysis in light of Court's difficulty
affixing relevant standard to gender-based cases).
83. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (stressing equal protection analysis when gay
and lesbian population challenged Colorado law barring promulgation of anti-dis-
criminatory laws for homosexuals); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 (expressing reluc-
tance of Court to highly scrutinize state motive in passing laws that may affect
groups of individuals' rights); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (demonstrat-
ing that excluding illegal aliens from Texas public school unnecessarily violated
equal protection rights of children who were discriminated against by law); Dep't
of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (reasoning that exclusion of "hip-
pies" in food stamp program violated equal protection jurisprudence).
134
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porting a robust notion of the right to personal autonomy.
84
Implementing this more searching form of rational basis review, Justice
Kennedy explained the lack of a legitimate state interest in Lawrence by
referencing Justice Stevens' dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick,85 a case decided
by the Court seventeen years earlier, which upheld the validity of a Geor-
gia sodomy statute prohibiting homosexual intimate relations. 86 There,
Justice Stevens wrote, "the fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not sufficient rea-
son for upholding a law prohibiting the practice."8 7 Thus, because Texas
had sought to support its sodomy statute based on the promotion of mo-
rality, 88 the Lawrence majority struck it down, albeit in somewhat ambigu-
84. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) ("Liberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes.., certain intimate conduct."). The Court further
explained:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and auton-
omy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of exis-
tence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)); see also
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 959 (Mass. 2003) (reading
Lawrence to stand for proposition that, "[w] hether and whom to marry, how to
express sexual intimacy, and whether and how to establish a family-these are
among the most basic of every individual's liberty and due process rights"). Profes-
sor Hunter has advanced the idea that Lawrence derives directly from the American
Model Penal Code and the British Wolfenden Report, both documents from the 1950s
concerning the criminality of homosexuality, and both drawn from Mill's moral
philosophy. See Hunter, supra note 4, at 1123 (suggesting that underlying princi-
ples of criminal theory from 1950s can account for notion of liberty of adults to
engage in sexual acts). One may plausibly point out that this Millian revolution
was actually started with the above-language of the Casey Court in 1992 (which
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Stevens and Blackmun joined). But only
three justices in Casey (Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter) relied on a sub-
stantive due process analysis, as an individual's right to autonomy had not yet been
located in the substantive component of the Due Process Clause by a majority of
the court at that time.
85. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
It may be that Justice Stevens' vote was obtained for the Lawrence majority through
agreeing to adopt the language of his dissent in Bowers. See Herald, supra note 25,
at 29 ("The Lawrence opinion reflects a carefully constructed political compro-
mise."). This may explain the incoherent final product produced by the majority.
86. The Bowers Court had been unwilling to recognize a fundamental interest
in this context and validated the Georgia statute under a traditional rational basis
review analysis. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191 (reasoning that homosexual sodomy is
not included as right inherently protected by Constitution because of its failure to
be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty") (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937))). Given Bower's reasoning, it is not at all surprising that
Lawrence expressly overruled it, declaring that "Bowers was not correct when it was
decided, and it is not correct today .... Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is
overruled." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
87. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
88. See id. at 582-83 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Texas attempts to justify its
law, and the effects of the law, by arguing that the statute satisfies rational basis
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ous language, as inconsistent with the interests that the two convicted men
had in their personal and private lives.
8 9
C. A Constitutional Balancing Act: Describing the Right to Private Intimate
Association Recognized by Lawrence
So how does the Court go about implementing its more searching
form of rational basis review in the substantive due process context? It
does not follow Justice O'Connor's more mechanistic approach in her
concurring opinion. To answer this question, it is necessary to leave be-
hind the rigid world of judicial standards of review encapsulated by such
concepts as "rational basis review," "intermediate scrutiny" and "strict scru-
tiny," and consider an approach that "softens" the "hard edges" of these
tripartite tiers.9 0 In its place, this article suggests that Lawrence, properly
conceived, represents an analytical approach recognizing that "there has
been at least a modest convergence away from tiers and toward general
balancing of relevant interests."9 1
Although this analysis previously has been applied in the field of
equal protection, applying this approach in the substantive due process
context is consistent with the interdependence of equal protection and
substantive due process analyses.9 2 Concerning this balancing approach,
review because it furthers the legitimate governmental interest of the promotion of
morality.").
89. See id. at 578 ("The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest
which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.").
90. See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 77 (finding that Supreme Court modified
traditional equal protection analysis during 1995 term, especially in Romer). Some
may argue that tiered scrutiny is just a balancing of interests, but by another name.
Be that as it may, a balancing of interests connotes a more informal weighing of
relevant interests, whereas tiered scrutiny seems overly and unnecessarily rigid, es-
pecially where personal and private rights are at stake. In this sense, the balancing
of interests discussed here is akin to Justice Marshall's sliding scale approach from
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 125-26 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (weighing State's interest in enacting financing scheme
against interest of private individuals in not being discriminated against within ed-
ucational system).
91. See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 77 (concluding that 1995 Supreme Court
term significantly modified its original hard-line stance for evaluating what quali-
fies as equal protection); see also Huhn, supra note 76, at 104 (maintaining that
Justice O'Connor's use of heightened scrutiny in her Lawrence concurrence "call [s]
into question the stability of the standards of review" that Court traditionally em-
ploys); Hunter, supra note 4, at 1130-31 (noting that rigid tiered system for equal
protection analysis may "collaps[e]"); Stein, supra note 11, at 270 n.46 (surveying
scholarly theories of standard of review for sexual activity and equal protection).
92. As discussed above, the same principles should be applied to substantive
due process analysis, as both doctrines are the opposite side of the same coin-
embracing concepts of equality and liberty to define the personal autonomy of the
individual. For a discussion of these concepts, see supra notes 38-46 and accompa-
nying text. Additionally, both Professor Sunstein and Justice O'Connor, in her
concurrence in Lawrence, make use of the Romer decision as an example of where
constitutional balancing had been utilized. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 584
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (declaring that equal protection clause does not toler-
[Vol. 50: p. 117
HeinOnline  -- 50 Vill. L. Rev. 136 2005
2005] LAWRENCE'S QUINTESSENTIAL MILLIAN MOMENT 137
Professor Sunstein has observed that the type of rational review utilized by
the Supreme Court in Romer was more akin to intermediate scrutiny em-
ployed for gender classifications, rather than the traditional rational basis
review utilized for tax or economic policy.9 3 Under this constitutional
sliding scale or balancing approach, a court should use rational review
"with bite" in the equal protection context "when prejudice and hostility
are especially likely to be present."9 4
Translating this "rational review with bite" test for the substantive due
process context to focus primarily on liberty rather than equality, height-
ened scrutiny is also appropriate when the state is in danger of intruding
into matters pertaining to sex and other personal and private issues. 95 In-
deed, the Lawrence Court makes clear that the freedom to engage in cer-
tain intimate conduct is one such matter that deserves additional
protection. 9
6
ate discrimination against classes of individuals weighed against mere moral disap-
proval by the state); Sunstein, supra note 12, at 77 (highlighting potential invalidity
of Romer rationality test as current notions of equal protection doctrine developed
in contemporary case law); see also Hunter, supra note 4, at 1118 (asserting that
Justices Kennedy, Stevens and Souter are moving Court toward more flexible ana-
lytical structure for evaluating substantive due process). Just as Justice O'Connor's
searching form of rational basis review has been implicitly adopted in the substan-
tive due process context, it is also clear that the Lawrence Court is applying a ver-
sion of constitutional balancing analysis to the substantive due process context as
well. For a discussion of this balancing, see infra note 98 and accompanying text.
93. See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 77 (suggesting that rational review in Romer
was closer to intermediate review). As pointed out above, this constitutional bal-
ancing approach derives directly from Justice Marshall's famous argument in favor
of a "sliding scale" rather than a tiered approach to equal protection issues. See
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 124-25 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that Court demands
clear showing of legitimate state interests when issues of constitutional importance
are at stake). Professor Sunstein also points out that this balancing approach de-
rives from Justice Stevens' famous admonition that, "there is only one Equal Pro-
tection Clause." See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 77 (citing Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 246 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 451-55 (1985) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring))); see also Huhn, supra note 76, at 105 (explaining that sliding scale approach
of Justice Stevens recognizes "continuum of judgmental responses" depending
upon legitimacy and neutrality of reasons offered in support of law).
94. See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 78 (describing Romer as using rational re-
view that strengthens the scrutiny with which Justices may review sex discrimina-
tion suits).
95. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 ("These references show an emerging aware-
ness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex."); see also Hunter, supra
note 4, at 1114 (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990))
("The recognition of a liberty interest not categorized as fundamental leads only to
a balancing of the individual's interests and government's, not to any presumption
against the statute in question.").
96. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (noting protections given to adults regarding
consensual sexual relationships). In addition to freedom to engage in certain inti-
mate conduct, such spheres free from state intrusion might best be described as
those spheres of privacy created by such cases as Griswold, Roe and Casey. See Tribe,
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Looking at Lawrence through this analytical prism, it is evident that
the Supreme Court applied heightened rational basis review to the Texas
sodomy statute because it believed that Texas was intruding into a private
and personal sphere of the convicted men's lives. But rather than apply-
ing a reflexive tiered approach through a more formal type of judicial
review, the Court instead stated, "[t]he Texas statute furthers no legiti-
mate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and
private life of the individual."9 7 Implicit in this statement is a balancing of
relevant individual and state interests. 9 8 Notice that the Court did not say
that "the Texas statute is not rationally related to a legitimate state pur-
pose." Rather, the Court balanced Texas' interest in promoting morality
against the interests of the two convicted men in their personal and pri-
vate lives, and found that the individuals' interests prevailed. 99 Thus, the
Lawrence Court engaged in an implicit constitutional balancing act in arriv-
ing at its Millian moment.10 0
The conclusion regarding the Lawrence Court's Millian moment is
theoretically important for the purpose of substantive due process consti-
tutional analysis. In order to ascertain the real practical impact that this
Millian approach to substantive due process might have in specific con-
texts involving personal relationships, however, it is necessary to consider
one particularly controversial context: public university use of consensual
relationship policies to ban some, or all, faculty-student relationships. It is
to this endeavor that this article now turns its attention.
III. THE ADVENT OF FACULTY-STUDENT CONSENSUAL RELATIONSHIP
POLICIES AT PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES
Until relatively recently, most universities did not have policies gov-
erning when, and if, a faculty member may be romantically involved with
one of his or her students. 0 1 Instead, universities relied upon sexual har-
assment policies to deal with sexual advances and relationships that were,
or became, unwanted from a student's point of view. 10 2 The thought ani-
supra note 4, at 1917 (discussing various standards of review used throughout Su-
preme Court substantive due process jurisprudence).
97. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
98. Accord Carpenter, supra note 4, at 1151 (arguing that use of "legitimate" in
Lawrence is better understood as comment on comparative weakness of state's mo-
rality claim against strong interests of convicted men).
99. See id. at 1157 (interpreting Lawrence as weighing interests involving per-
sonal and private life of individual against state's "mere legitimate" interest in reg-
ulating morality).
100. See Huhn, supra note 76, at 105 (arguing that Justice O'Connor's Law-
rence concurrence adopts stricter standard of review that is adjusted according to
various factors, including whether or not law affects private living arrangements).
101. See Hutchens, supra note 15, at 411 (discussing motivations for increase
of faculty-student consensual relations policies in universities and law schools).
102. See Sherry Young, Getting to Yes: The Case Against Banning Consensual Rela-
tionships in Higher Education, 4 Am. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'V & L. 269, 278 (1996)
(noting that most universities and colleges have some form of sexual harassment
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mating this laissez-faire approach was not based on any civil libertarian
ideal embraced by these universities, but rather by a hope that they could,
through sexual harassment policies, properly ferret out unwanted sexual
conduct by faculty members.'
0 3
In retrospect, this "liberal" approach to faculty-student relationships
appears overly naive in its outlook for two primary reasons. First, the con-
cept of consent has no, or a different type of, meaning in a relationship
with such a large power differential.1 0 4 In other words, students would
not file sexual harassment complaints against their professors, but rather
remain silent and feel forced to engage in such relationships for fear of
retribution in the form of a bad grade or bad recommendation. 10 5 Al-
though this notion in its unadulterated form lacks persuasive punch, the
power dynamic at play cannot be completely disregarded. 10 6
Second, sexual harassment law cannot single-handedly take into ac-
count relevant third party interests when it comes to determining the via-
bility of consensual relationships. 10 7 That is, even if two adult individuals
were completely happy with their relationship (assuming some meaning-
ful consent on the student's part), others,including third-party professors
and students, as well as the university itself, could be substantially harmed
by the existence of such a consensual relationship on campus.1 0 8 Such
harm might take the form of the tarnishing of a university's reputation,
policy in place that regulates relationships between students and faculty
members).
103. See Richard R. Carlson, Romantic Relationships Between Professors and Their
Students: Morality, Ethics and Law, 42 S. TEX. L. REv. 493, 499 (2001) (" [T]he vast
gray areas of sexual harassment law leave little if any room for a truly safe relation-
ship, and they create at least some risk in any romantic, amorous or intimate be-
havior with students.").
104. See, e.g., CATHERINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WO-
MEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 298 n.8 (1979) ("whether, under conditions of
male supremacy, the notion of consent has any real meaning for women . . .
whether it is a structural fiction to legitimize the real coercion built into the nor-
mal social definitions of heterosexual intercourse").
Because the faculty member and his or her colleagues are responsible for
grading the student, for writing recommendations, and for providing ref-
erences that will impact the student's life and career, the faculty mem-
ber's institutional role enacts a power imbalance even when faculty and
students are close in age or of the same sex.
Margaret H. Mack, Regulating Sexual Relationships Between Faculty and Students, 6
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 79, 94 (1999).
105. See Secunda, supra note 16, at 64 (explaining assorted pressures placed
upon students in sexual relationships with faculty members).
106. See id. at 80-84 (discussing sliding scale approach to faculty-student con-
sensual relationship policies).
107. See Mack, supra note 104, at 97 (exploring need for equity and trust
within educational settings, and how that equity and trust becomes lost when stu-
dents hear about their professor having romantic relationships with other
students).
108. See Secunda, supra note 16, at 63 (stating that, while students worry about
being treated less favorably, faculty members involved in these relationships lose
respect from their colleagues and risk potential sexual harassment lawsuits).
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liability imposed against the university once the relationship goes sour and
a sexual harassment suit is brought, the loss of academic integrity and col-
legiality in the faculty ranks and the perceived and/or real bias exper-
ienced by fellow classmates of the student-lover. 10 9
A number of public universities have now responded to this criticism
by ratcheting up the amount of protection given to students finding them-
selves in consensual relationships with their professors by adopting so-
called "advisory" policies, which strongly discourage these relationships 11 0
and/or require those who engage in such relationships to disclose such
109. See id. at 60 (explaining lingering negative effects of faculty-student
relationships).
110. See id. at 61-62 (discussing theory that professors should not participate
in relationships with students they supervise or advise). See, e.g., MICHIGAN STATE
UNIVERSITY, Conflict of Interest in Educational Responsibilities Resulting from Consensual
Amorous or Sexual Relationships (Nov. 8, 1996), available at http://www.msu.edu/
unit/provost/amrelpol.htm (requiring staff to report any consensual relationships
to their relevant unit administrator); OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, OFFICE OF HUMAN
RESOURCES, Policies and Procedures, Sexual Harassment Policy 1.15, Il. Regulations, A.
Consensual Relationships (Mar. 5, 2004), available at http://hr.osu.edu/policy/poli-
cyhome.htm ("Consensual romantic and sexual relationships between supervisor
and employee or between faculty and student are strongly discouraged."); PENN-
SYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, Policy AD41 Sexual Harassment, Consensual Relationships
(Jan. 3, 2000), available at http://lsir.1a.psu.edu/workfam/lir497/Ad41.html ("Ro-
mantic and/or sexual relationships between faculty and students, staff and stu-
dents or supervisors and subordinate employees are strong discouraged.");
UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS, FAYETrEVILLE, Sexual Harassment Policy, Consensual Relation-
ships (Feb. 1998), available at http://www.uark.edu/depts/ofaa/policy.html ("Even
when both parties have consented to a relationship, it is the faculty member, ad-
ministrator, or supervisor who may be held accountable for unprofessional behav-
ior."); UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS, University Policies, Policy on Consenting Relationships
(Feb. 1, 1994), available at http://www.provost.ku.edu/consentingrelations-pol-
icy.html ("University of Kansas strongly disapproves of consenting relation-
ships . . . ."); UNIVERSITY OF MAINE, OFFICE OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND DrVERsiTY,
University of Maine System Guidelines Regarding Consenting Relationships (Nov. 1990),
available at http://www.umaine.edu/eo/Policy/consenting.htm ("The policy
strongly discourages consenting relationships when one of the participants has
power or authority over the other, but does not prohibit them outright."); UNIVER-
SITY OF MiSSissIPPI, A Handbook for Faculty and Staff Sexual Harassment Guidelines and
Procedures for Faculty, Staff and Students, II.B. Consensual Relationships, available at
http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/HR/handbook/HB-sec2.html (last visited Oct.
25, 2004) ("consensual sexual relationships between the instructional staff and stu-
dents, as well as those between supervisors and their subordinates, are considered
unwise and are strongly discouraged"); UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, Revised
Handbook of Operating Procedures, Policy Number 4.A.2: Consensual Relationships (Nov.
1, 2001), available at http://www.utexas.edu/policies/hoppm/04.A.02.html
("[T]he University strongly discourages consensual relationships between supervi-
sors and subordinates, teachers and students and advisors and students."); UNIVER-
SITY OF UTAH, Faculty Handbook: Section III, 3.12 Sexual Harassment and Consensual
Relationships, available at http://www.admin.utah.edu/fhb/section-iii.html (last
visited Oct. 25, 2004) ("Romantic or sexual relationships between a faculty mem-
ber and a student are generally unwise .... "); UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN AT
MADISON, Sexual Harassment Information and Resources, Consensual Relationships (Oct.
23, 2002), available at http://www.wisc.edu/edrc/sexualharassment/consent.html
(requiring staff to report any consensual relationships to their supervisor).
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relationships so that the conflict of interest may be resolved.' 1 1 Addition-
ally, and more troublesome from a civil libertarian point of view, a signifi-
cant number of public universities have responded by banning outright
what they deemed the most problematic of these faculty-student consen-
sual relationships: those involving a clear conflict of interest. 112 In defin-
ing a conflict of interest, however, these universities do not consider the
actual specific conflicts that arise in individual circumstances, but rather
have adopted administratively convenient rules of thumb.1 13 Under these
policies, although there are some variations, 114 a professor is normally
banned from engaging in a romantic relationship with a student whom he
or she currently grades, supervises or otherwise evaluates. 1 5 On the other
hand, nonsupervisory relationships between a faculty member and a stu-
dent at the same university are either vaguely discouraged' 1 6 or not ad-
dressed at all.
1 1 7
111. Such conflicts of interests may be resolved in a number of ways, includ-
ing moving the student out of the class, substituting professors for the course or
having an outside third party closely monitor the classroom situation. See Hutch-
ens, supra note 15, at 422 (citing HuMAN RESOURCES, SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY, Sexual
Harassment Prevention Policy and Procedures (2003), available at http://
sumweb.syr.edu/ir/apm/Vphrgr/humres/appsex.html#conrel) (describing Syra-
cuse University's graduate student consensual relationship policy as one in which
faculty members are instructed to "take whatever steps are needed to avoid a con-
flict of interest. This requires reporting the relationship to an appropriate supervi-
sor, who will then arrange for other forms of evaluation or monitoring.").
112. See Secunda, supra note 16, at 62-64 (highlighting most troublesome
type of faculty-student sexual relationships).
113. For a further discussion of procedural and administrative strategies for
deterrence of student-faculty sexual relationships, see supra note 15 and accompa-
nying text.
114. See Hutchens, supra note 15, at 420-22 (contrasting consequences of uni-
versities' mandatory policies by which some faculty members may be removed from
authority or subject to disciplinary action if they engage in sexual relationships
with students).
115. See Secunda, supra note 16, at 62-63 (discussing dangers of conflict of
interest faculty-student relationships).
116. See id. at 84 (suggesting that nonsupervisory relationships may also have
detrimental effects). For an example of such policies, see UNwERSITY OF MINNE-
sOTA, Policy on Sexual Harassment and Consensual Relationships (1998), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/usenate/policies/sexualharass.html (referring to individu-
als' freedom of association in context of prohibitive behavior that "create [s] con-
flicts of interest.") and UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA-LAs VEGAS, Consensual Relationship
Policy, available at http://hr.unlv.edu/Diversity/Policy-Statements/Consensual-
Relations.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2004) (punctuating how consensual relation-
ships between faculty members and students do not fall under policy so long as
neither party directs authority over other party).
117. See Secunda, supra note 16, at 84 (discussing possible detrimental effects
of not addressing non-conflict of interest faculty-student relationships). For exam-
ples of such policies, see UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS, Policy Manual, Consensual
Relationships (2000), available at http://www.unt.edu/policy/UNTPolicy/vol-
ume1/l_3_23.html (failing to address nonsupervisory relationships) and UNVER-
SITY OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON, Fiscal Regulations and Procedures, Equal Opportunity and
Affirmative Action: Sexual Harassment, Sexual Misconduct and Consensual Relationships
(Sep. 12, 2003), available at http://www3.uta.edu/policy/fisregs/eoaa/3A-l.htm
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Last, the prohibitory approach, the most restrictive type of faculty-
student consensual relationship policy, has rarely been adopted by univer-
sities. 1 18 Under this approach, the university bans all supervisory and non-
supervisory sexual relationships between faculty and students. Because of
the serious constitutional privacy and intimate association concerns these
policies raised, even prior to Lawrence, their scarcity is hardly surprising.1 1 9
Sanctions under these conflict of interest policies for engaging in
such prohibited conduct can be quite severe, ranging anywhere from a
verbal reprimand to an outright dismissal from employment. 120 Neverthe-
less, the damage done to& a professor's career by being labeled a sexual
predator by his or her public university may be tantamount to ruining any
future academic career opportunities. Such punishment for a relation-
ship, which could conceivably be construed as voluntary between two con-
senting adults, appears out of proportion to any potential harm inflicted
on third parties.
Because of the inadequacy of the laissez-faire, advisory, conflict of in-
terest and prohibitory approaches to faculty-student consensual relation-
ship policies, elsewhere I have laid out an argument, from mostly a policy
standpoint, for a sliding scale approach to faculty-student consensual rela-
tionship policies.121 This argument asserts that the conflict interest ap-
proaches are either underinclusive, overinclusive or both. 122 Conflict of
interest policies are underinclusive because they only vaguely address non-
supervisory relationships, although nonsupervisory relationships may nev-
ertheless cause real conflicts of interests with regard to other students,
(defining misconduct as including only those relationships which arise out of au-
thoritative relationships).
118. See Hutchens, supra note 15, at 422 (citing COLLEGE OF WIUtIAM AND
MARv, Revised Policy on Consensual Amorous Relations (Oct. 23, 2001), available at
http://www.wm.edu/provost/consensual-relation.pdf). With the exception of
William & Mary, where the ban only applies to undergraduate students, I am aware
of no other public, higher-education institutions having adopted this more draco-
nian prohibitory approach. See Secunda, supra note 16, at 64-66 (discussing com-
plete bans on consensual faculty-student relations).
119. See Secunda, supra note 16, at 66 (discussing zero-tolerance polices in
lieu of importance of being able to freely associate with others).
120. See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF IOWA, Policy on Consensual Relationships Involving
Students (July 1, 2002), available at http://www.uiowa.edu/-eod/policies/pol-on-
consensual/pol-consensual-full.html (contemplating dismissal of faculty members
who violate policy); UNIVERSrY OF NEVADA AT RENO, Policy on Consensual Sexual
Relationships, available at http://www.unr.edu/sapd/documents/UNIVERSITY
POLICYONCONSENSUALSEXUALRELATIONSHIPS_000.pdf (last visited Oct.
25, 2004) (explaining that verbal or written warning will be given to both involved
parties).
121. See generally Secunda, supra note 16 (proposing effective standard of slid-
ing scale to address consensual relationships between students and faculty
members).
122. See id. at 80-81 (discussing shortcomings of other consensual
approaches).
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professors or to the university itself.123 Conversely, these policies are sig-
nificantly overinclusive because not every supervisory relationship causes a
conflict of interest that is insurmountable and/or because even if such
conflicts exist, the associational and privacy rights of the faculty member
may be deemed to supersede any relevant third party interests, at least in
some circumstances. 124
In the wake of the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Lawrence, it
is now also clear that the sliding scale approach to faculty-student relation-
ships is the only approach that is constitutionally sound.1 25 But before
considering the constitutionality of consensual relationship policies at
public universities that ban some or all faculty-student relationships, it is
first necessary to analyze the impact, if any, that the Lawrence decision
should have on faculty-student consensual relationship policies. At least
one commentator has argued that Lawrence may not be relevant for
faculty-student consensual relationship policies based on specific language
in the majority opinion. 126 Furthermore, and more significantly, an im-
portant question that must be answered is whether a case dealing with
criminal prohibitions (i.e., Lawrence) has any precedential value for a case
involving unconstitutional conditions in the public employment context
(i.e., a future case involving the constitutionality of faculty-student rela-
tionship policies that ban some, or all, such relationships).
IV. SHOULD LAWRENCE APPLY TO CONSENSUAL RELATIONSHIP POLICIES
THAT BAN SOME, OR ALL, FACULTY-STUDENT RELATIONSHIPS?
On its face, and most narrowly read, Lawrence only addresses the right
of homosexual adults to engage in private, intimate and consensual con-
duct free from criminal prosecution. 12 7 Nevertheless, from the breadth of
123. See id. at 80 (explaining why conflict of interest and prohibitory ap-
proaches are underinclusive).
124. See id. (explaining shortcomings of prohibitory and conflict of interest
approaches).
125. For further critical discussion on the constitutionality of the sliding scale
test applied in Lawrence, see infra, notes 203-31 and accompanying text.
126. See Hutchens, supra note 15, at 426 (stating that Lawrence may offer lim-
ited assistance to individuals challenging these policies, and its application to con-
sensual relationships remains somewhat doubtful).
127. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("This case does involve
two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual
practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to re-
spect for their private lives."). In fact, conservative courts around the country have
already used this aspect of Lawrence to narrowly construe the liberty interest de-
scribed in Lawrence. See Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1240(11th Cir. 2004) ("[W] e decline to extrapolate from Lawrence and its dicta a right
to sexual privacy triggering strict scrutiny."), reh 'g and reh 'g en banc denied, No. 02-
16135DD (11th Cir. Sept. 24, 2004), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec. 17, 2004) (No.
04-849); Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804,
816 (11th Cir. 2004) ("We are particularly hesitant to infer a new fundamental
interest from an opinion whose language and reasoning are inconsistent with stan-
dard fundamental rights analysis."), reh'g en banc denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (lth Cir.
143
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the language thatJustice Kennedy employs in the majority decision, Law-
rence signals the adoption of a much more broad-based notion of individ-
ual autonomy.1 2 8 This vigorous Millian notion of individual autonomy
finds its expression in Lawrence's innovative approach to substantive due
process.1 29 Viewed in this light, Lawrence notonly frees homosexuals en-
gaging in private conduct in their bedrooms from criminal prosecution,
but also applies to all individuals who seek to have the government respect
their personal autonomy.1 30 Nevertheless, there are still two potential
hurdles, which proponents of applying Lawrence more broadly to the pub-
lic employment context must overcome.
First, it must be determined whether certain language utilized by the
majority in Lawrence exempts state interference with faculty-student con-
sensual relationships, as these relationships potentially represent instances
in which "consent might not be easily refused," when "abuse of an institu-
tion protected by the law" is involved or where "public conduct" is in-
volved.13 1 All three of those instances represent specific types of conduct
that the majority in Lawrence exempted from its holding. That being said,
a close exegesis of these phrases makes clear that these sweeping
2004), cert. denied, 73 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2005) (No. 04-478); State v.
Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 234-35 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (looking at Lawrence narrowly by
not applying its holding to cases involving minors), review granted, (May 25, 2004);
Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 456-60 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (" [W]e
reject Petitioner's contention that Lawrence establishes entry in same-sex marriages
as a fundamental right."), review denied, (May 25, 2004). But see Goodridge v. Dep't
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d. 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (reading Lawrence to affirm "the
core concept of common human dignity protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution [which] precludes government intrusion into the
deeply personal realms of consensual adult expressions of intimacy and one's
choice of an intimate partner").
128. For a further discussion of individual autonomy, see supra notes 36-37
and accompanying text. But see Williams, 378 F.3d at 1238 (finding that Lawrence
does not stand for broad reading of right to sexual privacy).
129. For a further discussion of the relationship between this original ap-
proach to substantive due process and equal protection, see supra notes 38-100
and accompanying text.
130. Indeed, and if for no other reason, elementary principles of equal pro-
tection require that Lawrence's holding apply equally to heterosexual couples en-
gaged in the same conduct. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 439 (1985) (stating Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment "is
essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike").
131. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (substantiating one's fight to private sexual
conduct without government intrusion through Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments). While Justice Kennedy concludes that Texas has no legitimate interest in
outlawing private sexual behavior, he resounds a "promise of the Constitution"
afforded to all adult citizens entitled to private behavior. See id. (detailing origin
and scope of privacy rights constitutionally provided to adults participating in con-
sensual sexual activity) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847
(1992))).
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pronunciations do not properly apply to faculty-student consensual rela-
tionship policies in the public university context.1s 2
Second, it must be considered whether the government as employer
has more discretion to interfere with its employees' private relationships
than the state did in Lawrence when it was acting to impose criminal sanc-
tions in its role as sovereign. 133 Although the state does have more discre-
tion in the employment context, a constitutional balancing, similar to the
one discussed in Part ILC, must be undertaken to weigh the relevant state
and individual interests involved.134
An analysis of Lawrence does not indicate that public university poli-
cies should be exempt based on either of these legal hurdles. Therefore,
it must be determined how a court should constitutionally balance the
relevant interests involved when public universities seek to ban some or all
of these faculty-student relationships. This article contends that applica-
tion of this new form of substantive due process countenanced in Lawrence
to these consensual relationship policies in the public university context
leads to the inexorable conclusion that such policies are unconstitution-
ally overbroad and impose an undue burden on faculty member's rights to
privacy and intimate association.1 35
A. University Regulation of Student-Faculty Consensual Relationships is Not
Exempted from Lawrence as a Result of Any of Its Specific Language
While it is the contention of this article that the Lawrence Court ap-
plied a heightened form of rational basis review in order to protect the
right to form personal and private relationships, 13 6 the Court in Lawrence
emphasized that its holding did not apply to certain forms of intimate
conduct involving minors, coercion or public conduct. 13 7 Succinctly put,
132. For a discussion of Lawrence's impact on public universities' faculty-stu-
dent relationship policies, see infra notes 136-69 and accompanying text.
133. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (recognizing pub-
lic school teacher's right to speak out on matters of public concern without facing
adverse employment consequences, as well as distinction between government as
employer and government as sovereign). Pickering is the watershed case addressing
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in public employment. See id. at 568
("The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the inter-
est of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees."); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142-54
(1983) (refining doctrine of unconstitutional conditions for public employees in
context of First Amendment speech).
134. For a further discussion of Lawrence's application to faculty-student rela-
tionship policies, see infra notes 170-89 and accompanying text.
135. For a further discussion of the unconstitutional overbreadth of conflict
of interest and prohibitory faculty-student relationship policies after Lawrence, see
infra notes 190-202 and accompanying text.
136. For a further discussion of Lawrence and its reasoning, see supra notes
47-89 and accompanying text.
137. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (excluding certain sex-
ual actors from holding of case); see also Schwartz, supra note 4 (addressing consti-
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Lawrence recognizes an important limitation on the rights to privacy and
intimate association in certain nonconsensual and public circumstances.
For instance, an adult individual does not have the right to engage in pri-
vate sexual relations with a minor (even if the minor freely consents to
such conduct), 13 8 a man does not have the right to rape a woman in the
privacy of his own home1 3 9 and individuals are not free to engage in pub-
lic sex acts.1 40 Recognizing the nonconsensual and/or public nature of
these types of conduct, society has generally moved to protect the victims
of such conduct.1 4 1 All of this is consistent with a Millian notion of per-
sonal autonomy.
142
Nevertheless, there are parts of the Lawrence opinion that facially ap-
pear to give public universities greater latitude in protecting their interests
against the harms sometimes caused by faculty-student consensual rela-
tionships. It is to a consideration of this specific language that this article
now turns.
1. "Persons ... who are situated in relationships where consent might not be
easily refused"
In a recent law review article, Neal Hutchens argued that Lawrence
"may offer limited assistance to an individual challenging a [faculty-stu-
dent consensual relationship] policy." 143 According to Mr. Hutchens, one
tutionality of criminalized homosexual activity as narrow target amidst exaggerated
history of prohibition relayed in Bowers); Stein, supra note 11, at 281 (contrasting
clarity ofJustice Kennedy's narrow application of Lawrence to Justice Scalia's argua-
bly nebulous opinion as to how Lawrence "undermines laws against non-consensual
sex").
138. All of these exceptions are consistent with Mill's libertarian philosophy.
For instance, Mill explains that minors are not able to fully exercise their auton-
omy because they are not yet fully developed, mature individuals. See MiiL, supra
note 2, at 11 (noting that doctrine does not apply to persons below age that law
fixes as that of manhood or womanhood).
139. Under a Millian analysis, this type of criminal conduct would be "other-
regarding" and clearly subject to state regulation and punishment. See id. at 87
(acknowledging that actions prejudicial to interests of others may be subject to
punishment).
140. See id. at 91 (discussing limits to legality of acts injurious only to actors
themselves). Mill states:
[T] here are many acts which, being directly injurious only to the agents
themselves, ought not to be legally interdicted, but which, if done pub-
licly, are a violation of good manners, and coming thus within the cate-
gory of offences against others, may rightly be prohibited. Of this kind
are offences against decency ....
Id.
141. See Stein, supra note 11, at 281 (challenging claim that "ancient proposi-
tion that a governing majority's belief that certain sexual behavior is 'immoral and
unacceptable' constitutes a rational basis for regulation") (quoting Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 589 (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
142. For a discussion of the Millian notion, see supra notes 138-40 and ac-
companying text.
143. Hutchens, supra note 15, at 426.
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such reason is that faculty-student relationships represent a type of rela-
tionship "where consent might not easily be refused" because of the power
disparity in such relationships. 144 He thus doubts whether Lawrence pro-
vides any legal cover for faculty members at public universities who engage
in consensual relationships with their students. 145
This article rejects this narrow reading of the Lawrence decision on at
least two bases. First, this narrow reading of Lawrence takes the Court's
language out of context. Lawrence includes other examples of nonconsen-
sual intimate conduct, including criminal conduct involving minors, pros-
titution and other relationships where a person might be "injured or
coerced." 146 Read in this context, Justice Kennedy's comments in Law-
rence concerning what this case does not involve clearly separates consen-
sual intimate conduct from nonconsensual intimate conduct. 147 It is the
premise of this article that relationships between professors and students,
like homosexual private intimate relations, may, and often do, occur on
the consensual side of the line. 148
Nevertheless, some commentators believe that consent can never
have any meaning in the midst of a power relationship, such as that be-
tween a professor and student. 149 This view appears to be the position of a
small minority.150 More rationally, the power dynamics of these relation-
144. See id. (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578) (asserting reasons why Lawrence
probably does not effect university consensual relationship policies).
145. See id. (concluding that "[t]he extent to which Lawrence limits consensual
relationship policies at public universities and colleges remains somewhat
doubtful").
146. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (distinguishing Lawrence facts from other
situations). As Professor Edward Stein has commented, "[t]he state clearly has
compelling reasons beyond the moral disapproval of its citizens for laws that pro-
hibit non-consensual sexual activities, namely that such laws protect the non-con-
senting party (e.g., a young child, an animal, or a young family member) from
harm." Stein, supra note 11, at 281. For a discussion of Mill's perspective on
nonharmful activity, see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
147. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (discussing specific facts of case). In other
words, nonconsensual intimate conduct can be properly punished by the state
based on legitimate interests beyond the mere promotion of morality. In those
cases, harm to others is involved and the state always has been considered to have
the ability to protect public health and public safety. See Goldberg, supra note 13,
at 1254-56, 1259 (discussing morals-based laws and their justifications); see also
supra note 26 and accompanying text.
148. Where such consent is absent, the federal and/or state law of sexual har-
assment (as well as the criminal law of rape) may be implicated and faculty-student
consensual relationship policies are irrelevant. For the sake of argument, this arti-
cle assumes that the faculty-student relationships under consideration are consen-
sual, even though this is often one of the thorniest issues to resolve once such a
relationship has gone south. See Secunda, supra note 16, at 60 ("[I]t is not always
so easy to determine whether a sexual relationship is consensual or nonconsen-
sual. The answer to such a question may sometimes change day-to-day given the
volatile nature of these relationships.") (footnote omitted).
149. For a discussion of this view, see supra note 104 and accompanying text.
150. We know that this is the view of a small minority of those in the academy
because to take this view to its logical conclusion would require the adoption of a
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ships that lead to university concerns should be balanced against the rights
to privacy and intimate association elaborated upon in the Lawrence deci-
sion. 15 1 Rather than completely denying such individual rights in all cir-
cumstances, individual cases need to be analyzed by weighing the relevant
state and individual interests at stake before permitting the state to in-
fringe upon the personal autonomy of its employees. 152 Any more restric-
tive interpretation of the rights to privacy and intimate association
recognized in Lawrence would be draconian and unjustified in light of the
significant number of anecdotal stories relating mutually satisfying faculty-
student relationships.
153
2. "Absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects"
Another reason that Mr. Hutchens asserts for why university consen-
sual relationship policies may be exempt from this wider notion of per-
sonal autonomy espoused by Lawrence is because of language in which the
Lawrence Court counsels "against attempts by the State, or a court, to de-
fine the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to
a person or abuse of an institution the law protects."' 154 In this vein, Mr. Hutch-
ens argues that this language gives ample wiggle room for courts to defer
to the policy judgments of universities and colleges to regulate intimate
relationships between faculty and students.
155
This reading of the Lawrence decision is flawed for at least two reasons.
First, even Mr. Hutchens recognizes that the Lawrence Court is probably
not talking about an institution like a university or college, but is instead
referring to an institution like marriage.1 56 Indeed, throughout the ma-
prohibitory approach to consensual relationships, banning both supervisory and
nonsupervisory relationships. At present, only one public university, William &
Mary, has adopted such a policy, and then, only in the undergraduate context. For
additional comment on complete bans on faculty-student relationships, see supra
note 118 and accompanying text.
151. This approach is consistent with the balancing of state and individual
interests required under the Pickering unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See
Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (determining that there must be
balance between teacher's interests and state's interest). For a discussion of the
similarity of these approaches in greater detail, see infra notes 170-89 and accom-
panying text.
152. For a discussion of this sliding scale approach to faculty-student relation-
ships, see infra notes 170-89 and accompanying text.
153. See Dan Subotnik, What's Wrong With Faculty-Student Sex?-Response II, 47
J. LEGAL EDuc. 441, 442 (1997) (criticizing argument that there needs to be abso-
lute ban on faculty-student sex because of power imbalance).
154. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (emphasis added); see also
Hutchens, supra note 15, at 426 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567) (asserting rea-
sons why Lawrence probably does not apply to university consensual relationship
policies).
155. See Hutchens, supra note 15, at 426 (discussing possibility that colleges
and universities may still legally enact consensual relationship policies).
156. See id. (noting that Justice Kennedy was probably more concerned with
institution of marriage); see also Carpenter, supra note 4, at 1153 (analyzing this
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jority opinion, Justice Kennedy is attempting to exempt the institution of
marriage from Lawrence's sweeping language to refute Justice Scalia's con-
tention, in dissent, that the holding in Lawrence will inevitably lead to a
right to same-sex marriage. 157 Moreover, because this statement is made
in the context of states and courts interfering with the "meaning of rela-
tionships," it is highly unlikely that Justice Kennedy was referring to insti-
tutions of higher education when making this statement. 158
Second, Mr. Hutchens pays insufficient notice in his article to the rec-
ognized right to intimate association. 159 Instead, he limits his discussion
to cases discussing "associational rights at public colleges or universities"
in the First Amendment context and finds, not surprisingly, "the cases [to
be] of limited usefulness" for consideration of constitutional challenges to
public universities' consensual relationship policies. 160 On the contrary,
language under assumption that institution so described by Lawrence is marriage);
Tribe, supra note 4, at 1950 (discussing this language in relation to same-sex
marriage).
157. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Law-
rence majority destroyed grounds to distinguish between heterosexual and homo-
sexual unions). Justice Scalia stated:
[T]he Court says the present case "does not involve whether the govern-
ment must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual
persons seek to enter." Do not believe it .... This case "does not involve"
the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that
principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this Court.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor also attempts to explain why her equal
protection analysis does not concern homosexual marriage. See id. at 585
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that this law's failure does not mean that all
laws that make distinctions between heterosexuals and homosexuals would also
automatically fail). Although I agree withJustice Scalia that concepts of equal pro-
tection and substantive due process do require formal recognition of homosexual
marriages, I do not believe thatJustice Kennedy so holds in his majority decision in
Lawrence and, in fact, he and Justice O'Connor bend over backwards not to so
hold. See Stein, supra note 11, at 275-76 (noting that Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor stated that their reasoning does not lead to conclusion that laws defin-
ing marriage as between two people of opposite sex are constitutional).
158. Even if a court were to construe "institutions" to refer to higher educa-
tion institutions, this interpretation may run afoul of the Establishment Clause. See
Arnold H. Loewy, Morals Legislation and the Establishment Clause, 55 ALA. L. REv. 159,
161 (2003) (proposing test to determine whether statute violates Establishment
Clause). Under Professor Loewy's proposed test:
If the activity involves morality simpliciter, i.e., the legislature simply con-
demns the activity because it is immoral, the law should be held to violate
the Establishment Clause. On the other hand, if the legislation is predi-
cated on purposive morality, i.e., morality that serves a secular function,
the law should be sustained.
Id. Thus, if there is evidence that the public university administration's approach
is animated by primarily religious concerns, such as prohibiting premarital fornica-
tion, such policies should be stricken down under the Establishment Clause.
159. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) (noting different
lines of freedom of association cases, including fight to intimate association).
160. See Hutchens, supra note 15, at 426-27 (finding that most cases dealing
with associational rights are focused on restrictions placed on funding for campus
groups).
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what is at stake in these faculty-consensual relationships is not some gen-
eral associational right to join a group or club under the First Amend-
ment, but the right to intimate association between two consenting adults,
which the Court has placed squarely at the heart of the substantive compo-
nent of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 6 1 It is
this precedent, which supports the Millian notion of personal autonomy,
that Justice Kennedy espouses in his Lawrence opinion. Viewed further in
this light, it is clear that Justice Kennedy could not have been referring to
institutions of higher learning when acknowledging that states may inter-
fere with personal relationships if there is "abuse of an institution the law
protects." 162
3. Persons engaged in "public conduct or prostitution"
Of course, one might also argue that because faculty-student relation-
ships rarely ever remain strictly private (regardless of the best intentions of
the parties), 163 this conduct falls into the category of "public conduct"
exempted from the general holding of Lawrence.164 This interpretation of
the Court's language is untenable. "Public conduct," as used by the Court,
concerns commercial behavior like prostitution, which is mentioned con-
junctively in the same sentence as "public conduct."165 On the other
hand, the Court specifically recognizes that the rights to privacy and inti-
mate association are not constrained by spatial limits. 166 Instead, it en-
compasses a right to autonomy in its more "transcendental
dimensions., 1 6 7
All in all, a better reading of Lawrence permits its application to rela-
tionships between faculty members and students, who are both adults as
161. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620 (recognizing that certain associational rela-
tionships are intrinsic to personal liberty).
162. Mr. Hutchens also suggests that any successful challenge to a consensual
relationship policy would require that a plaintiff overcome arguments that univer-
sities and colleges have a special status that requires courts to defer to their policy
judgments. See Hutchens, supra note 15, at 428-29 (discussing deference given to
universities to "preserve the integrity of the academic process"). I have argued
elsewhere that even though public universities have a special status under the law
when making academic decisions, no such judicial deference is due when a college
undertakes a disciplinary action. See Secunda, supra note 16, at 74-77 (discussing
limits on judicial deference when dealing with disciplinary action). Disciplining a
professor for engaging in a consensual relationship with a student is a disciplinary
decision due no deference by courts, especially where the constitutional rights to
privacy and intimate association are involved. See id. (same).
163. See Secunda, supra note 16, at 81 (noting how private consensual rela-
tionships may become public).
164. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 563, 578 (2003) (discussing what case did
and did not involve).
165. See id. ("It does not involve public conduct or prostitution.").
166. See id. at 562 ("Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds."); see also Tribe,
supra note 4, at 1950-51 (arguing that intimacy, companionship and love are phe-
nomena that have public, as well as private, facets).
167. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (explaining conception of liberty).
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far as the law is concerned and both capable of consensual conduct. 168
When it comes to private intimate conduct between two consenting adult
individuals, one's liberty to engage in such conduct does not cease at the
front door of one's home, as "there are other spheres of our lives and
existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant
presence."'169
B. The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions: Does Lawrence Even Apply
to the Faculty-Student Consensual Relationship Context?
Another significant argument that may be made as to why Lawrence
should not apply to the faculty-student relationship context concerns the
different roles the state plays: "as sovereign" versus "as employer."170 On
the one hand, because Lawrence involves a criminal prohibition concern-
ing sodomy, the government was cast in the role of sovereign in that
case. 171 On the other hand, in the higher education context, the govern-
ment acts as an employer of the faculty member. The question is whether
the government, as employer, has placed unconstitutional conditions on
the faculty member's public employment by passing a constitutionally re-
strictive employment policy involving with whom he or she may engage in
a relationship. 172
In primarily the First Amendment speech context, the Supreme
Court has observed that the government has more discretion in taking
action against individuals in its role as employer than in its role as sover-
168. Under most state laws, an individual is no longer considered a minor
after attaining the age of 18. See generally Alfred D. Mathewson, Intercollegiate Athlet-
ics and the Assignment of Legal Rights, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 39, 74 & n.158 (1990)
("The age of majority in many states is now 18 .... ."). This article does not con-
cern relationships between teachers and students under the age of majority, as
such relationships would in most cases amount to the strict liability crime of statu-
tory rape. See Leslie E. Wolf & Richard Vezina, Crime and Punishment: Is There a Role
for Criminal Law in HIV Prevention Policy, 25 WHITrIER L. REv. 821, 877-78 (2004)
(observing that "[s]exual relations with minors have been criminalized as a way of
protecting minors who are not yet capable of making informed decisions or pro-
tecting their interests").
169. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
170. See Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (discussing different
state interests as sovereign and as employer).
171. The Williams case, which dealt with the commercial distribution of sexual
aids, also took place in the government as sovereign context. See Williams v. Attor-
ney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that Alabama
statute banning sale of sex toys was not unconstitutional), reh'g and reh'g en banc
denied, No. 02-16135DD (11th Cir. Sept. 24, 2004), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec.
17, 2004) (No. 04-849).
172. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967) ("[T]he
theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected
to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.").
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eign. 1 73 Nevertheless, under the Pickering v. Board of Education174 / Connick
v. Myers175 line of cases, a court must "arrive at a balance between the
interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of pub-
lic concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees."
1 76
Moreover, under the parallel doctrine of unconstitutional conditions:
[E]ven though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmen-
tal benefit and even though the government may deny him the
benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon
which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to
a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected
interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech.
177
Both the Pickering/Connick line of cases and the doctrine of unconsti-
tutional conditions have been historically limited to freedom of speech
and association cases under the First Amendment. 178 Nevertheless, given
the recent affirmation of the rights to privacy and intimate association in
the Lawrence case, there does not appear to be any good reason to limit
these doctrines to the First Amendment context. The Supreme Court, at
least in dicta, in Bishop v. Wood, 179 appears to agree.1 8 0 At bottom,
173. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 ("[I]t cannot be gainsaid that the State has
interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ signif-
icantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the
citizenry in general.").
174. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
175. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
176. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 142 (reaffirming
this language as task for courts to handle).
177. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); see also FCC v. League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984) (invalidating federal law providing that
noncommercial radio and television broadcasters who "engaged in editorializing"
could not receive federal grants); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234
(1977) (prohibiting conditioning of government employment on whether one
makes contributions to particular political causes); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-8, 681 & n.29 (2d ed. 1988) (describing "unconstitu-
tional conditions" doctrine as holding that although government may choose not
to provide certain benefits altogether, it may not condition conferral of benefit,
once provided, on beneficiary's waiver of constitutional right). It appears that the
Pickering/Connick line of cases is closely related to the unconstitutional conditions
cases, as the Supreme Court has considered Pickering's progeny to include Perry.
See Connick, 461 U.S. at 143 n.4 (listing progeny of Pickering).
178. The general principle that "a State cannot condition public employment
on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in free-
dom of expression," has not been applied in any significant way outside of the First
Amendment context. Connick, 461 U.S. at 142. See generally Jason Mazzone, The
Waiver Paradox, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 801, 810-16 (2003) (reviewing number of Su-
preme Court cases that establish that doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has
been most vigorously applied in First Amendment context).
179. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
180. See id. at 350 ("In the absence of any claim that the public employer was
motivated by a desire to curtail or to penalize the exercise of an employee's consti-
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whether the case is about expressive speech or private intimate conduct,
both are constitutionally protected rights and the government, as em-
ployer, should not be able to willy-nilly infringe upon a public employee's
constitutional rights.' 8 1 Consistent with Pickering and Bishop, this article
suggests that an unconstitutional conditions-type analysis is proper in the
substantive due process context. 182 Under this analysis, as in Pickering, the
constitutional interests of the public employees must be weighed against
the state interest in promoting the efficiency of government services.
18 3
This approach makes perfect sense if one considers the constitutional
balancing approach discussed in relation to the new approach to substan-
tive due process that Lawrence adopts. 18 4 Rather than answering the ques-
tion as to whether a public university may condition a faculty member's
employment on not engaging in a private, intimate relationship with a
student in a clear-cut "yes" or "no" response, the answer must be "it de-
pends." It depends on whether the government, as employer, is able to
show that the private intimate conduct of its employees has a detrimental
impact on the university environment.' 85 As discussed above, this impact
might take the form of tarnishing the university's reputation or subjecting
the university to potential sexual harassment liability.' 8 6 Such harm may
also be in the form of the loss of academic integrity from the standpoint of
interested third-party students and professors. 187
In all cases, the relevant state and individual interests must be ana-
lyzed and weighed in order to determine whether the governmental inter-
est in avoiding disruptions of the university environment outweigh the
faculty member's right to engage in a private, intimate relationship with a
student. 18 8 As will be discussed in detail below, although consensual rela-
tionship policies that ban some or all faculty-student relationships in the
tutionally protected rights, we must presume that official action was regular and, if
erroneous, can best be corrected in other ways.").
181. See id. (same).
182. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (holding that
public employment may not be denied by unreasonable unconstitutional condi-
tions on that employment); see also Bishop, 426 U.S. at 350 (discussing federal court
review of unconstitutional conditions of employment).
183. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (establishing test for balancing of interests).
184. For a discussion of these approaches, see supra notes 90-100 and accom-
panying text.
185. See Secunda, supra note 16, at 80-84 (proposing approach to faculty-stu-
dent consensual relationship based on nexus principle of labor arbitration law,
which requires private conduct to have detrimental impact on workplace before
employer may sanction it). For a discussion of the sliding scale approach to evalu-
ate the required showing, see infra notes 203-31 and accompanying text.
186. For a discussion of the.possible harm to the university, see supra note 109
and accompanying text.
187. For a discussion of any harm to third parties, see supra note 109 and
accompanying text.
188. For a discussion of this balancing, see supra notes 90-100 and accompa-
nying text.
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public university context are unconstitutionally overbroad, the sliding
scale approach to faculty-student consensual relationship policies ade-
quately undertakes the necessary balancing of interests. 189 Therefore,
only the sliding scale approach is consistent with the notion that the gov-
ernment as employer should have more discretion in intruding upon lib-
erty interests than the state of Texas did in Lawrence, while simultaneously
recognizing the importance of the faculty member's interests in privacy
and intimate association.
C. Public University Policies That Seek to Ban Some or All Faculty-Student
Consensual Relationships Are Unconstitutionally Overbroad
Having cleared away two potential obstacles in applying Lawrence to
faculty-student consensual relationship policies, it is now necessary to de-
termine what impact Lawrence has on policies that ban some or all faculty-
student relationships. Prior to Lawrence, the judicial determination of the
constitutionality of such policies probably would have turned on the ab-
sence of any traditional fundamental interest "deeply rooted in this Na-
tion's history and tradition." 190 Furthermore, the university had more
than enough legitimate reasons for prohibiting such relationships, rang-
ing from the propensity of such relationships to interfere with the univer-
sity's institutional and academic integrity to the institutional liability to
which such relationships sometimes lead.'9 1
After Lawrence, and because public universities, as surrogates of the
state, are attempting through consensual relationship policies to intrude
into areas of faculty members' lives pertaining to personal and private mat-
ters, heightened rational review is now proper.1 92 This standard of judi-
cial review stems from the Lawrence Court's implicit adoption of a similar
heightened or searching standard in the substantive due process context,
in order to be cognizant of the substantial interest that inheres in the
rights to privacy and intimate association.
Unfortunately, the mere existence of the rights to privacy and inti-
mate association, due some form of heightened rational basis review, does
not answer the question of whether public university consensual relation-
ship policies that ban some or all faculty-student relationships are constitu-
tional. To arrive at the crux of the matter, it is necessary to consider how
courts should weigh a faculty member's rights to privacy and intimate asso-
189. For a discussion of the sliding scale approach, see infra notes 203-31 and
accompanying text.
190. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (examining two
primary features of substantive due process analysis).
191. For a discussion of the ensuing harm that warrants such university poli-
cies, see supra note 109 and accompanying text.
192. For a discussion of heightened rational review, see supra notes 47-89 and
accompanying text.
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ciation against the relevant third party interests of the university and other
interested students and faculty members.
193
Because, in the wake of Lawrence, the rights to privacy and intimate
association are now given substantial protection under the liberty interest
contained in the substantive component of the Due Process Clause, the
state must have more than just a traditional legitimate interest-it must
have a superseding interest-to intrude into the professor's sphere of per-
sonal autonomy.19 4 Based on Lawrence's reasoning, the state may not bur-
den an individual's liberty interest in this context based solely on the
promotion of a majoritarian morality. 195 Rather, state regulation through
the vehicle of a faculty-student consensual relationship policy must be
based on a showing that there are state interests at play that are important
and that outweigh any countervailing privacy or intimate association rights
the faculty member may have. Such interests may include the interests of
the public university to maintain its reputation and avoid liability and/or
the interests of third-party faculty and students who seek to eliminate the
existence, or perception, of favoritism or bias in the academic setting.
196
If such reasons are lacking, however, the university's actions disciplining a
professor under such a policy should be considered invalid and the profes-
sor reinstated.
Although it will not be clear which way the constitutional scales will
tip until the facts of individual cases are developed, what can be said with-
out hesitation is that a public university policy promulgating a blanket rule
prohibiting faculty-student intimate relationships in some or all situations
is overbroad and represents an undue burden on the rights of the faculty
member involved. 19 7 After Lawrence, a constitutionally sound consensual
relationship policy must not completely disregard the very real constitu-
193. For an analysis of the weighing process, see supra notes 90-100, 170-89
and accompanying text.
194. For a discussion of the state's required interest, see supra notes 90-100
and accompanying text.
195. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582-83 (2003) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring) (asserting that moral disapproval is not rational basis for discrimination
under Equal Protection Clause).
196. For a discussion of the possible interests of the university in creating pro-
hibitive policies, see supra note 109 and accompanying text.
197. This "undue burden" language is borrowed from the Casey decision, in
which the Court said that governmental abortion regulations must not have an
undue burden on a woman's ability to have an abortion. See Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879-901 (1992) (examining various regulations on abortion
under undue burden test, such as spousal notification and informed consent).
Professor Decker suggests that the Casey Court's invocation of undue burden to
strike down certain Pennsylvania spousal notification limitations on the right to
abortion smacks of an overbreadth-type analysis outside the First Amendment con-
text. See Decker, supra note 21, at 91-92 ("[T] he abortion line of cases is the most
prevalent example of the Court's use of overbreadth-type analysis outside the First
Amendment arena."). I use "undue burden" in the faculty-student consensual re-
lationship context to suggest overbreadth as well.
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tional privacy and associational interests of the affected professor.' 9 8 Even
if faculty-student supervisory relationships will be permitted only in limited
circumstances, 199 it is essential that such interests be given their due so as
not to inadvertently diminish the importance of the privacy and associa-
tional rights recognized by the Lawrence Court.20 0 The door must be left
open to the possibility that in a given situation the substantial interests of
the faculty member in those rights outweigh the interests of the public
university. Therefore, public university policies, which seek to ban some
or all faculty-student relationships, should be deemed unconstitutionally
overbroad, placing an undue burden on faculty members' rights to privacy
and intimate association. 20 ' Consequently, any public university faculty-
student consensual relationship policy which bans outright some or all of
these relationships, such as a conflict of interest or prohibitory consensual
relationship policy, should be struck down or not adopted in the first
place by public university administrators. 20 2
V. A CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND ALTERNATIVE: THE SLIDING SCALE
APPROACH TO FACULTY-STUDENT CONSENSUAL
RELATIONSHIP POLICIES
So what is the alternative to these unconstitutional consensual rela-
tionship policies that ban some or all faculty-student relationships? As op-
posed to those overbroad policies, a path not yet taken in the context of
faculty-student consensual relationships is a sliding scale approach. Under
this approach, consensual relationships are neither always permitted nor
198. See Secunda, supra note 16, at 83 (identifying professors' privacy interests
in consensual sexual relations with students).
199. See id. at 82-83 (describing potential limited circumstances in which
faculty member's interests may outweigh those of universities).
200. See id. (assessing "blanket prohibition on supervisory relationships in the
higher education setting [as] inappropriate").
201. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (suggesting that undue burden standard is apt
standard for constitutional balancing tests by maintaining that "the undue burden
standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the State's interest with the wo-
man's constitutionally protected liberty"); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164
(1973) (finding that Texas statute authorizing only medically advised abortions
carried out to save life of mother "sweeps too broadly"); Decker, supra note 21, at
84 ("[A] governmental objective cannot be accomplished 'by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly[,] invading the area of protected freedoms."') (quoting
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965))) (alterations omitted).
202. Although private universities and colleges are generally not held to con-
stitutional standards for the policy reasons discussed above, it is still in the best
interest of private institutions of higher education to adopt such sliding scale ap-
proaches to faculty-student consensual relationship policies. For a discussion of
the public-private dichotomy, see supra note 14 and accompanying text. See gener-
ally Secunda, supra note 16 (proposing sliding scale approach for faculty-student
consensual relationships in higher education).
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strictly prohibited. 2°3 As an initial matter, therefore, this approach is con-
sistent with heightened review in the unconstitutional conditions context,
which requires a constitutional balancing of interests. 20 4 In other words, a
public university may not just tread heedlessly on an individual's rights to
privacy and intimate association, but must engage in a careful weighing of
the equities involved, which change from case to case and from year to
year, before intruding into the private lives of its employees.
20 5
In addressing these harms to others, the sliding scale approach estab-
lishes certain presumptions based on whether the professor has current
academic responsibility for the student.20 6 These presumptions assist in
constraining the discretion of the courts when they apply this constitu-
tional balancing test.20 7 The sliding scale approach's use of these pre-
sumptions in its treatment of supervisory and nonsupervisory relationships
is considered in turn below.
A. The Presumption Against Supervisory Faculty-Student Relationships
For obvious reasons, supervisory relationships between faculty and
students can easily cause substantial harm to a public university's reputa-
tional and financial concerns, while at the same time undermine the credi-
bility of the academic process from the standpoint of third party students
or faculty members. 20 8 Consequently, in most cases, the university would
prevail and could prohibit (and/or sanction) such supervisory relation-
ships by showing that its substantial interests in enacting a consensual rela-
tionship policy outweigh the rights to intimate association and privacy that
the professor enjoys. 20 9 Indeed, the strength of the interests on the
203. See Secunda, supra note 16 at 81 ("[T]he sliding scale approach is consis-
tent with the idea that there can be no bright line rules in applying the nexus
principle.").
204. For a discussion of heightened review and the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine, see supra notes 90-100, 170-89 and accompanying text.
205. Professor Eskridge has argued that in this regard, the Millian approach is
well suited for taking into account not only various third party harms, but also the
fact that the identity and nature of these harms may change over time. See Es-
kridge, supra note 5, at 1101 (noting that libertarian approach contains dynamic
component, in which existence of third-party harms often depends critically on
changing social understandings of world).
206. See Secunda, supra note 16, at 81-84 (explaining sliding scale approach).
207. See Paul M. Secunda, Politics Not as Usual: Inherently Destructive Conduct,
Institutional Collegiality, and the National Labor Relations Board, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
51, 99 (2004) (observing that presumptions do not totally eliminate decision
maker discretion, but may nevertheless structure and constrain it).
208. For a discussion of the effects of supervisory relationships, see supra note
109 and accompanying text.
209. There are numerous reasons why such supervisory relationships are pre-
sumptively prohibited, all grounded in the fact that it is difficult for such relation-
ships to truly exist in a manner that does not harm the interests of others. See
Secunda, supra note 16, at 81 (justifying presumption against supervisory faculty-
student relationships). For instance, because the student will be interacting with
the professor in class or within some other institutional context, there will nor-
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faculty member's side of the legal scale is diminished based on the com-
mon retort that in most cases such relationships may continue once the
semester has ended and, therefore, the supervisory aspects of the relation-
ship have been terminated.2 10 Such interests are also likely diminished in
the face of the increased deference given to academic decision-making by
recent decisions of the Supreme Court.2
11
Only if the professor in a supervisory relationship can carry his or her
heavy burden of showing that the faculty member's interests in pursuing
the relationship outweigh the state's interests in preventing such relation-
ships may the relationship be permitted.2 12 What this most likely means
in practice is that the faculty member must establish that there does not
exist more than a de minimis detrimental impact on the college or univer-
sity community for the individual interests to outweigh the state inter-
ests. 2 13 This potential outcome is consistent with both the balancing
mally be an evident conflict of interest between the professor's interests as educa-
tor versus his or her interests as lover. See id. at 82 (citing William C. Heffernan,
Privacy Rights, 29 SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 737, 806 (1995)) (same). Moreover, per-
ceived bias will normally infect the atmosphere and harm the academic integrity of
the institution. See id. (citing Mack, supra note 104, at 82) (same). Perhaps most
importantly, from the universities' point of view, such consensual supervisory rela-
tionships may lead a spurned lover to file a vindictive sexual harassment charge
and cause the university to suffer through a high profile lawsuit, which, regardless
of the outcome of the lawsuit, will cause diminishment of funds from the univer-
sity's coffers. See id. (same).
210. See id. at 64 (identifying criticism of opponents to conflict of interest
approach).
211. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) ("Our holding today is
in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university's aca-
demic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits."). The Court in Grutter
upheld the use of affirmative action in the law school context. See id. (deferring to
school's judgment that diversity is "essential to its educational mission"). I have
argued elsewhere that I believe such enforcement of a faculty-student consensual
relationship policy is primarily a disciplinary decision not entitled to deference.
For a discussion of this disciplinary aspect, see supra note 162 and accompanying
text. Nevertheless, it is possible that a court in this context will either diminish the
individual's interests or inflate the state's interests as a result of the public educa-
tional context. See also Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78,
86 (1978) ("The need for flexibility is well illustrated by the significant difference
between the failure of a student to meet academic standards and the violation by a
student of valid rules of conduct. This difference calls for far less stringent proce-
dural requirements in the case of an academic dismissal.").
212. See Secunda, supra note 16, at 82 (establishing burdens of sliding scale
approach).
213. See id. at 83 (giving examples where burden might be overcome). Of
course, it may be pointed out that the sliding scale approach is attractive in theory,
but leads to professors inevitably hoisting themselves on their own petards. The
argument is that in order to show that the substantial interests surrounding the
supervisory relationship with a student outweigh the university's and other third
parties' relevant interests, the professor will have to adduce evidence that will be
violative of the very same privacy the rule is seeking to protect in the first place. In
response, I do not foresee professors meeting their burdens in these cases by testi-
fying themselves, or having others testify, about the intimacies of their relations;
rather, I envision them relying upon certain less invasive proxies to show the seri-
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approach to substantive due process described above and the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions as it contemplates limited circumstances when
the constitutional rights of the faculty member will outweigh the interests
of the university and other relevant third parties.2 14 Although these in-
stances may be few and far between, 215 an appreciation of the importance
of these constitutional rights requires no less.2 16 The constitutional door
to these personal relationships must remain open, even if just slightly, to
satisfy the Millian conception of individual autonomy advanced by the
Lawrence Court.217
Although potential criticisms of the sliding scale approach from a pol-
icy standpoint have been discussed elsewhere, 2 18 there no doubt will be
some additional criticisms from a constitutional point of view. Critics
might well argue that, by allowing an open-ended balancing approach in
these types of cases, the certainty encouraged by the normal tiered ap-
proach will be destroyed and, eventually, lead to judicial activism and per-
haps even a weakening of individual rights.2 19 Be that as it may, the rules-
based approach supported by the traditional tiered judicial standards of
review has its own disadvantages, including the diminution of substantial,
ousness of their relationship and the lack of concern the university and others
should consequently have in the continuation of that relationship. For instance,
two thirty-something individuals, one professor and one student, engaged to be
married at the end of the semester does not present the same issues and problems
as a fifty year old professor and an eighteen year old student engaging in a casual
sexual fling.
214. For an analysis of this balancing approach and the unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine, see supra notes 90-100, 170-89 and accompanying text.
215. See Secunda, supra note 16, at 82-83 (discussing situation where profes-
sor in supervisory role may overcome interests of university).
216. See id. at 83 (recognizing scarcity of permissible relationships in this
context).
Although the instances of when such supervisory relationships are per-
missible may not be many, and most... should be prohibited, I am never-
theless unwilling to countenance an approach to faculty-student
consensual relationships that completely ignores the very real privacy and
associational interests, constitutional and otherwise, that exist in this
context.
Id.
217. This slightly ajar constitutional door is necessary because there may be
instances when the potential for harm is minimal and consent of the student is not
at issue. See Mack, supra note 104, at 92 (basing her conclusion on potential for
harm to students).
218. See Secunda, supra note 16, at 82-84 (anticipating criticism that counter-
vailing presumptions established by sliding scale approach could never be
overcome).
219. See Carpenter, supra note 4, at 1141 (arguing that libertarian reading of
Lawrence actually weakens individual rights because judges fearful of activist label
will permit empirical claims of third-party harm to often trump liberty claims); see
also Sunstein, supra note 12, at 78 (noting that general movement in direction of
balancing would be nothing to celebrate because of, inter alia, loss of ability of
individuals to plan their conduct going forward).
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and in some cases, decisive privacy and intimate association rights.220 In
fact, it is this author's belief thatjudges commonly use the tiered approach
of judicial review to hide and validate their normative preferences in de-
ciding difficult cases.22 1
It is my preference that these balancing exercises take place in a
forthright, analytical manner for all to see and that judicial discretion is
meaningfully constrained by the presumptions in the sliding scale ap-
proach. 222 The presumptions employed under the sliding scale approach
will substantially prevent the excessive risk of inconsistent and politically
motivated judicial determinations.2 23 In short, the balancing of relevant
interests is the only satisfactory manner in which to proceed in this
context.
B. The Presumption in Favor of Nonsupervisory Faculty-Student Relationships
Consideration of how supervisory relationships between faculty and
students should be addressed by consensual relationship policies is only
half the analysis. Current conflict of interest consensual relationship poli-
cies are also substantially underinclusive in the manner in which they deal
with nonsupervisory relationships between faculty and students (for in-
stance, where an undergraduate professor dates a law student).224 In most
conflict of interest policies, such relationships are merely discouraged, or
even worse, not considered at all.22 5 Needless to say, such relationships
can cause the same harm to faculty members and students, as well as to
220. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudica-
tion, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685, 1687-713 (1976) (comparing open-ended standards
and mandatory rules).
221. See generally Goldberg, supra note 75 (proposing single standard of review
in equal protection jurisprudence).
222. It should be noted that the sliding scale approach does not adopt the
classically liberal approach of Professor Gary Elliot in arguing for what amounts to
basically a laissez-faire approach to supervisory consensual relationships. See Gary
E. Elliott, Consensual Relationships and the Constitution: A Case of Liberty Denied, 6
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 47, 75-76 (1999) ("The sexual lives of consenting adults
absent a violation of law, are not the business of the academy."). Rather, it takes
seriously the rights of both the faculty members and other interested third parties
and attempts to weigh the equities on a case-by-case basis and in a just manner.
223. Of course, a sliding scale approach may also lead to the unsettling of ex
ante expectations for a professor contemplating a relationship with a student, as
they will not know how to structure their behavior based on a well-settled, bright-
line rule. Thus, this rule may deter consensual conduct as much as some of the
present rules. Nevertheless, the sliding scale approach sets forth for the faculty
member the considerations that will most likely be taken into account if the con-
sensual relationship should come under review and, therefore, provides some di-
rection to the professor, while also respecting the professor's rights to privacy and
intimate association. (I would like to thank Professor Eugene Kontorovich of the
George Mason Law School for exploring this issue with me in depth).
224. See Secunda, supra note 16, at 80 (asserting that some nonsupervisory
relationships may be impermissible).
225. For a discussion of nonsupervisory policies, see supra notes 116-17 and
accompanying text.
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other relevant third parties and, therefore, such policies do not provide
the needed flexibility to deal with harmful nonsupervisory
relationships. 226
On the other hand, the sliding scale approach counsels that if there is
no current evaluative or supervisory relationship between the professor
and student, such a consensual relationship presumptively does not im-
pact negatively the college or university and thus should be permitted. 227
Again, the important point here is that the interests of the university,
other faculty members and students are not ignored, but in appropriate
circumstances may be weighed against the faculty member's rights to pri-
vacy and intimate association established by Lawrence.228 Accordingly, the
burden should be on the public university to establish that a detrimental
impact exists that requires a regulatory response. 229 If the nonsupervisory
relationship has a discernible and detrimental impact on the college or
university environment, then the professor should be subject to discipline
or be required to cease the relationship, as he or she has just as much
interfered with the learning atmosphere as the professor who has engaged
in a supervisory consensual relationship. 230
Thus, the sliding scale approach to both supervisory and nonsupervi-
sory consensual relationships in the public university context does not
only make good policy sense, but "also is constitutionally sound. Such an
approach respects the overlapping, and sometimes contradictory, interests
of the faculty member, student-lover, university and other third parties,
while simultaneously providing a workable framework that permits the bal-
ancing of the individual and state interests involved. In providing decision
makers with such flexibility, public universities adopting the sliding scale
approach will be acting consistently with the Lawrence Court's constitu-
tional mandate-giving adequate respect to the privacy and intimate asso-
ciation interests that inhere in these consensual relationship situations-
226. See Secunda, supra note 16, at 84 (providing that, where nonsupervisory
relationship has detrimental impact on school, sliding scale approach allows disci-
plinary action).
227. See Young, supra note 102, at 288 ("Where the professor is not responsi-
ble for evaluating the student ... the 'coercion' argument becomes quite weak.").
228. Such a weighing of interests could take place in a non-invasive manner as
described above. For a discussion of this process, see supra note 213 and accompa-
nying text.
229. See Secunda, supra note 16, at 83-84 (allocating burden to university). In
rebutting the presumption of permissibility, the university will have to garner evi-
dence to support its case. Nevertheless, I do not foresee the university being able
to engage in discovery concerning private, intimate matters, as such information
should be protected from disclosure based on the right to privacy and intimate
association recognized in Lawrence. Like the professor in the supervisory case, the
university in nonsupervisory cases will have to mount their challenge through cir-
cumstantial evidence as described above. For an example, see supra note 213 and
accompanying text.
230. See Secunda, supra note 16, at 84 (providing that university may over-
come its burden in nonsupervisory relationships).
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while at the same time protecting against substantial disruptions on
campus.
23 1
VI. CONCLUSION
The Lawrence decision gives constitutional validation to ideas that I
have elsewhere attempted to encapsulate while promoting the sliding scale
approach to faculty-student consensual relationship policies. By redefin-
ing the relationship between substantive due process and equal protec-
tion, by invoking a heightened level of rational basis review in the
substantive due process context and by adopting a constitutional balanc-
ing approach to weigh the relevant state and individual interests, Lawrence
provides a quintessential Millian moment. Conceptions of individual sov-
ereignty once again are taken seriously and governmental action that too
eagerly and heedlessly intrudes into the private lives of individuals is struck
down. The impact of this moment in Supreme Court history appears to be
far-reaching and monumental, as has been demonstrated by this article's
consideration of Lawrencds impact on the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions and the public university faculty-student consensual relation-
ship policy context. The true influence of Lawrence, however, will not be
known for many years to come, and not decisively so until the Supreme
Court has the opportunity to apply its Lawrence precedent to a case involv-
ing unconstitutional conditions in the public employment context.
231. The sliding scale approach already benefits from being derived from the
well-established nexus principle of labor arbitration law. See id. at 66-79 (discuss-
ing development of labor arbitration nexus test and its application to university
setting). Now, after Lawrence, university administrators and reviewing courts will be
able to consult an ever-increasing body of substantive due process law elaborating
on Lawrence, which will further structure and define the contours of policies that
seek to regulate these faculty-student consensual relationships.
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